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As 3D printing technology improves, the theoretical endpoint comes 
into view: a machine that, like the “replicators” of Star Trek, can pro-
duce anything the user asks for out of thin air from a digital blueprint. 
Real-life technology may never reach that endpoint, but our progress to-
ward it has accelerated sharply over the past few years—sharply enough, 
indeed, for legal scholars to weigh in on the phenomenon’s disruptive 
potential in areas ranging from intellectual property to gun rights. 
This Article is concerned with the First Amendment status of the 
digital blueprints. As of August 2014, it is the first law review article to 
address the intersection of 3D printing with free speech beyond the specif-
ic context of 3D-printed guns. I show that as “replicator” technologies 
pick up, the distribution of digital blueprints will begin to replace the 
distribution of goods as a central regulatory concern. This transition, in 
turn, will inspire First Amendment challenges to efforts by the govern-
ment to restrain or penalize the distribution of the files. A handgun li-
censing law, for instance, might be said to violate the First Amendment 
prohibition against prior restraints if it were applied against a digital 
blueprint’s “informational” content. 
Such arguments should fail, and fail badly, in most situations. In-
deed they will have to, lest free speech become a wide Lochner-esque 
freedom to manufacture. Instead, I will argue that the “informational” 
appearance of a digital blueprint is constitutionally irrelevant, and that 
the First Amendment should not even come into play absent some extrin-
sic reason to think that the digital blueprint is being used for an expres-
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sive purpose. The presence of a digital blueprint in a fact pattern, in oth-
er words, should not in itself affect the First Amendment analysis either 
positively or negatively. I nonetheless express some skepticism, drawing 
on turn-of-the-century case law on software and recent case law on medi-
cal data, that the Supreme Court will maintain this attitude of equa-
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INTRODUCTION 
3D printing, also known as “additive manufacturing,” is a 
roughly thirty-year-old technology for manufacturing objects from 
digital models known as “CAD” files.1 The most common variety 
of 3D printer works much like a traditional inkjet printer. Just as an 
inkjet printer extrudes ink onto a paper surface in two-dimensional 
shapes, a 3D printer prints thin, flat shapes with molten plastic goo. 
Each two-dimensional shape is only one layer in a three-
dimensional object, and each layer is printed on top of the last. 
Thus, given a CAD model of a cone pointed upward, a 3D printer 
prints first a circle, and then a slightly smaller circle on top of the 
first, and then a slightly smaller circle on top of the second, and so 
on until a plastic cone has been built from the digital image.2 
Until a few years ago, these technologies cost too much and 
took up too much room for small consumer use.3 Today, an entry-
level desktop 3D printer costs under $1,000 and the plastic fila-
ment costs about $15 per pound.4 The entry of 3D printing to a 
small-consumer market, together with recent advances allowing 
industrial-level 3D printers to print metal objects, has the hype 
cycle in full swing.5 
And as 3D printing technology improves, the theoretical end-
point comes into view: a machine that, like the “replicators” of 
Star Trek, can produce anything the user asks for out of thin air 
from a digital blueprint.6 Star Trek’s replicators, after all, are the 
                                                                                                                            
1  CAMPBELL ET AL., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, COULD 3D PRINTING CHANGE THE WORLD? 
TECHNOLOGIES, POTENTIAL, AND IMPLICATIONS OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/101711_
ACUS_3DPrinting.PDF. CAD stands for “computer-aided design.” 
2  See The Printed World, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.economist
.com/node/18114221. 
3 See  CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 5 (introducing “Desktop-scale 3D Printers,” 
and noting that 3D printing was, “in the past . . . relegated to large design and 
manufacturing firms”). 
4  3D Printers & Supplies, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8
&node=6066126011 (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). These prices are volatile, but 
representative of what was available on Amazon as of September 9, 2014. 
5  See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
6  See, e.g., Replicator, MEMORY ALPHA, http://en.memory-alpha.org/wiki/Replicator 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2014); see also Star Trek: The Next Generation: Data’s Day (CBS 
television broadcast Jan. 5, 1991) (Data and Worf shop for wedding gifts using a replicator 
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logical conclusion of the 3D printer’s premise. All improvements in 
manufacturing technology, including improvements developed be-
fore 3D printing, consist of cost reduction.7 The 3D printer (or 
more accurately, the 3D printer of the near future) stands out from 
these past improvements only in that 1) the reduction in manufac-
turing cost is so precipitous that individual users can manufacture 
objects more cheaply than they could purchase them from a larger-
scale industrial manufacturer and 2) it offers a “single tool” means 
that can produce any shape without changing any aspect of the 
production process.8 3D printers and their successors along the 
close approach to zero marginal cost can all be thought of as ap-
proximations of the replicator, which reduces the cost to all the 
way to zero.9 
A true zero-marginal-cost replicator would extend the speed 
and abundance of the Internet beyond the traditionally “informa-
tional” sphere into the physical world. Just as Internet users know 
very little scarcity of access to public information, replicator users 
would know very little scarcity with respect to material goods. 
These goods would be distributed, copied and shared in all the 
same ways, and with the same degree of ease, as the “information-
al” content distributed over the Internet today. The Internet’s 
economic and legal disruptions—think Napster and newspapers—
would spill over from the media and telecommunications industries 
into markets for every other sort of good as the technological 
“firewall”10 between information goods and physical goods indus-
tries fell away. 
                                                                                                                            
console); Star Trek: The Next Generation: The Defector (CBS television broadcast Jan. 1, 
1990) (Romulan Sublieutenant Setal replicates a glass of cold water). 
7  See Jeremy Rifkin, Say Goodbye to Capitalism as We Know It, MARKET WATCH (May 
15, 2014, 6:29 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/say-goodbye-to-capitalism-as-
we-know-it-2014-05-15/print (“Businesses have always sought new technologies that 
could increase productivity and reduce the marginal cost of producing and distributing 
goods and services, in order to lower their prices, win over consumers and market share, 
and return profits to their investors.”). 
8  See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
9  See, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 7. 
10  See id. (“Economists acknowledge the powerful impact Zero Marginal Cost has had 
on the information goods industries, but until recently, have argued that it would not 
cross into the brick-and-mortar economy of energy, and physical goods and services. That 
firewall has now been breached.”). 
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Real-life technology may never get all the way to a zero-
marginal-cost replicator. Today’s 3D printers are far from it. Nev-
ertheless, we have accelerated sharply in the replicator’s direction 
over the past few years—sharply enough, indeed, for President 
Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address to celebrate 3D print-
ing’s “potential to revolutionize the way we make almost every-
thing.”11 This “revolution” is already occurring at the industrial 
level, where enterprise-level 3D printers have been used to build 
medical prosthetics,12 automotive components, and quick proto-
types in various sectors.13 A Chinese firm recently built ten houses 
in a day using four giant 3D printers.14 
The “revolution” is further off at the consumer level, where 
the available materials are shoddy, print times are long, and the 
learning curve is steep.15 A paper has argued that for a typical 
household, an entry-level 3D printer pays for itself over the course 
of a year by reducing the prices of a typical basket of consumer 
goods—salt shakers, a safety razor, lots of iPhone cases, pot hold-
ers.16 These items are available on Thingiverse.com, the Disneyl-
and of 3D printing.17 It is hard to know what to make of the au-
thors’ conclusion. Much of their “basket” appears to be filled with 
dollar-store chintz as opposed to useful or necessary goods, and the 
authors admit the fact that contemporary 3D printing still requires 
a considerable degree of human intervention to reach a finished 
                                                                                                                            
11  Barack Obama, President, United States, State of the Union Address 2013 (Feb. 12, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2013 [hereinafter 2013 
State of the Union]. 
12  Ariel Rothfield, Huntington Doctor Among First to Use 3D Printing Knee Replacement 
Surgery, WOWKTV.com (July 2, 2014, 6:50 PM), http://www.wowktv.com/story/
25929980/huntington-doctor-among-first-to-use-3D-printing-knee-replacement-surgery. 
13  CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
14  Melissa Goldin, Chinese Company Builds Houses Quickly With 3D Printing, 
MASHABLE (Apr. 28, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/04/28/3D printing-houses-
china/. 
15  See Conner Forrest, What’s Holding Back 3D Printing from Fulfilling Its Promise?, 
ZDNET (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/whats-holding-back-3d-printing-
from-fulfilling-its-promise/ 
16  Wittbrodt et al., Life-Cycle Economic Analysis of Distributed Manufacturing with Open-
Source 3-D Printers, 23 MECHATRONICS 713 (2013), available at http://www.sciencedirect
.com/science/article/pii/S0957415813001153. 
17  See generally THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
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product.18 At the consumer level, it is hard at this point to see any 
real savings. But a more mature replicator technology, one that 
could tool a wider range of goods at higher quality and near-zero 
cost, would dramatically change a household’s entire pattern of 
consumption19 and, as President Obama said, “revolutionize the 
way we make everything.”20 
Such a “revolution” implies a separate revolution in the way 
we regulate everything that we make. Despite the present fixation 
on gun manufacturing, intellectual property “piracy” and other 
intentionally subversive uses of replicator technology, the bulk of 
the disruption will be more mundane, and will reach all corners of 
the law of products. Professor Engstrom, for instance, has noted 
that the “democratization” of manufacturing will upend many of 
the industrial-age economic premises that underlie various imposi-
tions of strict product liability on merchants.21 
In a replicator economy, the distribution of digital blueprints 
will replace the distribution of goods as a central regulatory con-
cern. This transition, in turn, will inspire First Amendment chal-
lenges to efforts by the government to restrain or penalize the dis-
tribution of the files. A handgun licensing law, for instance, might 
be said to violate the First Amendment prohibition against prior 
restraints if it were applied against a digital blueprint’s “informa-
tional” content. 
In Part I of this Article, I will assess the merit of claims that 
CAD files should fall under the First Amendment’s coverage—
roughly speaking, whether they should be considered “speech”—
in light of their informational content. If so, then the most aggres-
sive interpretations of contemporary First Amendment doctrine 
                                                                                                                            
18  As my wife observed, a student leaving for college probably would save a good deal 
of money printing the things in the items in the basket, but the savings are less credible 
later in the lifecycle. The basket included the following eighteen items: iPhone 5 dock, 
iPhone 4 dock, iPhone 5 case, jewelry organizer, garlic press, caliper, wall plate; 12 
shower curtain rings, shower head, key hanger, iPad stand, orthotic, safety razor, pickup, 
train track toy, Nano watchband, iPhone tripod, paper towel holder, pierogi mold, and 
spoon holder. 
19  See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 9–11; see also Rifkin, supra note 7. 
20  2013 State of the Union, supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
21  See Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the 
Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 41 (2013). 
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could grind almost all attempts to regulate replicated goods to a 
halt. I then brief the merits of the coverage question, discussing 
along the way the lower courts’ attempts since the 1990s to grapple 
with similar questions in the context of computer software. I con-
clude that the “informational” appearance of a digital blueprint 
should be disregarded as constitutionally irrelevant, and that the 
First Amendment should not even come into play absent some ex-
trinsic reason to think that the CAD file is being used for an ex-
pressive purpose. The simple presence of a CAD file in a fact pat-
tern, in other words, should not in itself affect the First Amend-
ment analysis either positively or negatively. 
The point of Part II is to demonstrate that there is no way 
around regulating CAD files in a replicator-based economy. Over 
time, the extent of online policing will escalate in a roughly inverse 
proportion to the ongoing decline in manufacturing’s marginal 
cost. This escalation will eventually force the First Amendment 
issues briefed in Part I into the courts. Finally, in Part III, I outline 
some jurisprudential pitfalls that I hope the courts can avoid when 
the time comes. 
A note on terminology: most of the arguments I make in this 
Article are not specifically addressed to present-day 3D printers 
and their accompanying limitations. As my cursory discussion 
above of the mechanics of 3D printing should make clear, I do not 
consider the contemporary technical specifications of 3D printers 
to be important to the First Amendment discussion.22 In fact, the 
points I raise here apply with increasing force to later-generation 
“replicators”23 that have transcended present-day limitations. As a 
theoretical construct, I will for much of the discussion assume that 
we are dealing with household-affordable “replicators” that, just as 
on Star Trek, produce objects out of thin air, and I will call them by 
                                                                                                                            
22  See James Grimmelmann, Indistinguishable from Magic: A Wizard’s Guide to 
Copyright and 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683, 684 (2014) (“[L]et us start from 
the wisdom of Clarke’s Third Law: that beyond a certain point, the technological details 
no longer matter. What if 3D printers actually are magic?”). 
23  So long as I am talking about Star Trek-style “replicators,” I might as well call them 
“replicators” rather than “3D printers” to keep things straight. I would hate for readers 
picking up in the middle of this paper to think I am overestimating present-day 
technology. At any rate, I cannot imagine that the clunky expression “3D printers” will 
survive for long in a culture seemingly at the cusp of abandoning the “2D printer.” 
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that name: “replicators.” To be clear, the point of this construct is 
to call into the sharpest possible relief the First Amendment issues 
raised by near-zero-marginal-cost manufacturing; the point is em-
phatically not to make any long-term technological forecast. 
I. CAD FILES AS FIRST AMENDMENT SUBJECT MATTER 
We have yet to see any serious legislative or regulatory efforts 
to control the distribution of CAD files. (Philadelphia’s breathless 
attempt to stop the importation of 3D printed guns imposed fines 
for the printing rather than the downloading.)24 We have seen one 
early enforcement action, but the distributor backed down out of 
court. Specifically, the State Department demanded in 2013 that 
University of Texas law student Cody Wilson take down the CAD 
files for ten weapons designs25 from his website, DEFCAD.org.26 
The agency cited a set of export restrictions under the Internation-
al Trade in Arms Regulations that require official authorization be-
                                                                                                                            
24  Philadelphia’s law, PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 10, ch. 10-2000 (2013), is so poorly 
crafted that you almost have to laugh. Aside from the obvious—how do you enforce a law 
against the printing, but not the possession, of a 3D printed gun?—the law’s coverage is 
all wrong. By targeting all “3D printing” of firearms, and by defining “3D printing” to 
include all production of physical objects from digital designs, the Philadelphia law 
reaches at least some mainstream, industrial-scale gun commerce. Solid Concepts, Inc., 
for instance, has begun to produce metal handguns using an industrial-grade 3D printer 
and to sell them for over $10,000. World’s First 3D Printed Metal Gun Manufactured by 
Solid Concepts, SOLID CONCEPTS, http://www.solidconcepts.com/news-releases/worlds-
first-3D-printed-metal-gun-manufactured-solid-concepts/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014); 3D 
Printed Metal Gun Will Sell to Lucky 100, SOLID CONCEPTS, https://www.solidconcepts
.com/news-releases/3d-printed-metal-gun-will-sell-lucky-100/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014); 
see also Robert Farago, Gun Review: Solid Concepts 1911 DMLS, TRUTH ABOUT GUNS 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2013/12/robert-farago/gun-review-
solid-concepts-1911-dmls-direct-metal-laser-sintering/. Solid Concepts’ gun raises none 
of the special concerns about home printing and unregistered weaponry that inspired 
Philadelphia’s law. Congressman Steve Israel’s well-publicized bill to amend the 
Undetectable Firearms Act also addresses the printing of gun components rather than the 
CAD files themselves. H.R. 1474, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill, at any rate, is unlikely to 
pass. 
25  These included a pistol, a silencer adapter, and an anti-tank warhead. Letter from 
U.S. Dep’t of State to Cody Wilson (May 8, 2013), available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/140471313/Letter-from-Department-of-State-to-Defense-Distributed. 
26  Id. 
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fore “technical data” relating to weapons can be “exported.”27 
Wilson quickly complied.28 
It is in some ways surprising that Wilson did not try to make a 
First Amendment test case out of this incident. Wilson is above all 
else a political activist, and he frames the DEFCAD project in free 
speech terms.29 DEFCAD’s website, for a time, linked to John Mil-
ton’s Areopagitica,30 the seminal 17th-century defense of a free 
press, as its “manifesto.”31 Following the State Department’s ta-
kedown letter, Wilson joked on Twitter that “some shapes are 
more dangerous than others”32: a joke that seems to align CAD 
files with a world of forms—speech stuff—rather than of material 
things.33 
It makes sense for Wilson to invite these associations. It is a 
powerful thing to frame your adversary as an enemy of free speech, 
perhaps the most highly revered value in American political rhetor-
ic.34 Wilson would not be the first to wrap a whole new platform in 
                                                                                                                            
27  Id. 
28  Cody R. Wilson (@Radomysisky), TWITTER (May 9, 2013, 10:54 AM), https://
twitter.com/Radomysisky/status/332554133192183808. 
29  See The Glenn Beck Program (The Blaze television broadcast Jan. 17, 2013), available 
at http://www.video.theblaze.com/media/video.jsp?content_id=25560075&topic_id=
24584158 (interview by Glenn Beck with Cody Wilson) (“I think liberty is itself under 
siege: human liberty, human spontaneity, the freedom to do things.”). 
30  JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, (Project Gutenberg eBook ed. 2013) (1644), available 
at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/608/608-h/608-h.htm. 
31  Mark Lepage, 3D Home Printing Turns Ideas Into Substance, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 
2, 2013, http://www.vancouversun.com/mobile/business/vs-business/home+printing+
turns+ideas+into+substance/8744254/story.html. 
32  Wilson, supra note 28. 
33  You are not supposed to dwell too long on any of this. Only one part of Milton’s 
argument against England’s press licensing law relates to the gun-control issue, and then 
only very broadly. As for the “shapes” zinger, it seems to presume the same Platonic 
dichotomy between matter and information that the DEFCAD project generally seems 
designed to refute. Wilson seems to have learned, whether consciously or not, that 
audiences respond well when you hit them with a name drop and run. See the interview 
by Glenn Beck with Cody Wilson, supra note 29, where Wilson tells Beck to read more 
Michel Foucault: “There’s a guy named Michel Foucault, and I’d recommend that you 
read him sometime.” 
34  See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1790 (2004) (“To an extent 
unmatched in a world that often views America’s obsession with free speech as reflecting 
an insensitive neglect of other important conflicting values, the First Amendment, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press provide considerable rhetorical power and 
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that flag.35 Free speech claims have worked for campaign dona-
tions,36 encryption code,37 and prescription drug data.38 The plain 
meaning of the First Amendment’s word “speech” is so broad and 
indeterminate that boundary-pushing litigants can make weird 
claims about its scope without having those claims rejected as fri-
volous.39 
A. Distinguishing First Amendment Coverage from First Amendment 
Protection 
Most of the discussion in this section concerns what Professor 
Schauer has referred to as First Amendment “coverage” rather 
than First Amendment “protection.”40 By “protection” I mean 
that after the application of the various tests and doctrines that fill 
out a traditional course in First Amendment law, a court will con-
clude that the First Amendment protects the speaker from regula-
tion. Protection means that the speaker wins. 
By “coverage” I refer to the threshold question of whether a 
given case is “about” the First Amendment at all. It is common to 
frame the question of coverage as concerning whether a certain ac-
tivity “is speech” or not.41 This approach is intuitive because it 
allows the coverage/protection distinction to be mapped onto the 
constitutional phrase “the freedom of speech,” with “speech” re-
                                                                                                                            
argumentative authority. The individual or group on the side of free speech often seems 
to believe, and often correctly, that it has secured the upper hand in public debate. The 
First Amendment not only attracts attention, but also strikes fear in the hearts of many 
who do not want to be seen as opposing the freedoms it enshrines.”). 
35  See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 54–55 (2012) (discussing an appropriation of 
free-speech rhetoric by gun-rights activists) (“The First Amendment has also generated a 
deep, detailed body of judicial doctrine over a period of almost a century, and the right of 
expressive freedom carries a great sense of legal and cultural gravitas. Accordingly, 
analogizing the Second Amendment to the First has not only practical utility but strategic 
appeal for advocates of a robust right to keep and bear arms.”). 
36  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
37  See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1139, reh’g granted, 
opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
38  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
39  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 34, at 1797–98. 
40  See id. at 1769–74. 
41  See, e.g., R. George Wright, What Counts As “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining 
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
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ferring to coverage and “the freedom” referring to the scope of 
protection. The problem with this shorthand is that many instances 
of “speech,” taken in the ordinary meaning of the word, never me-
rit any First Amendment discussion at all.42 These include contrac-
tual speech, speech in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, speech 
barred by antitrust laws, speech in corporate proxy elections, and 
so on.43 And by the same token, First Amendment coverage ex-
tends beyond the ordinary meaning of the word as well to reach the 
visual arts, expressive conduct, and so on.44 
The coverage question is mostly handled subliminally; it is rare 
for a court to spend any energy on it. As such, there is very little 
doctrine on the question of coverage, and what little there is does 
not envision a systematic approach.45 Academic commentary on 
the question is insightful but scarce, and suggests that coverage is a 
historically moving target that defies systematic exposition.46 
But if we do not know where coverage comes from, we none-
theless know what it looks like: where there is a lack of coverage, 
First Amendment arguments are treated as frivolous47 or, more 
frequently, are left unraised.48 Where coverage is present, on the 
other hand, courts must at least consider First Amendment argu-
ments before rejecting them.49 There is some middle ground be-
tween these two poles, of course, as in the common situation where 
a dismissive judge considers a “meritless” First Amendment point 
purely for the sake of argument;50 but the presence or absence of 
                                                                                                                            
42  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 1773 (“That the boundaries of the First Amendment 
are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech’ is simply 
implausible.”). 
43  Id. at 1779–83; see also Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
645, 784 (1980) (“Language serves a variety of functions, only some of which are covered 
by the special reasons for freedom of speech.”). 
44  See, e.g., Ryan J. Walsh, Comment, Painting on a Canvas of Skin: Tattooing and the 
First Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2011). 
45  See infra note 140 for a brief discussion of Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 
(1974), which is sometimes cited as the authoritative “speech test.” 
46  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 1765. 
47  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 1797–98. 
48  See id. 
49  See id. 
50  See, e.g., Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996). For criticisms of 
such attempts to “bypass” the coverage issue, see also Wright, supra note 41, at 1226–31. 
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coverage is nonetheless an easy thing to discern, if not to explain, in 
the vast majority of cases.51 
To date there is no case law engaging the coverage question in 
the precise context of CAD files. There are several lower court 
opinions discussing the First Amendment status of other applica-
tions of computer code, though. These opinions divide on the 
question of protection, but almost all of them agree that source 
code, if not object code,52 is as at least covered.53 
1. Why Coverage Matters 
First Amendment coverage implies a rebuttable presumption 
that a given activity cannot be regulated consistently with the First 
Amendment.54 Successful rebuttal ultimately depends on a balanc-
ing of regulatory interests against expressive interests.55 The ba-
lancing is right there on the surface in the “normal” run of First 
Amendment cases, which, as a matter of black-letter law, always 
trigger either strict or intermediate scrutiny or occasionally some 
heightened variation on rational-basis review.56 Here, the balance 
of harms is too sensitive to resolve through the application of any 
on-or-off rule, so we see judges weighing the seriousness of the 
government’s purpose and the fit of means to ends explicitly and 
case-by-case.57 
But there is a balancing by other means even in simple cases in-
volving the “unprotected categories” of speech: obscenity, fighting 
words and so on. It is just that as far as the unprotected categories 
                                                                                                                            
51  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 1800–01. 
52  For a discussion of the distinction between source code and object code, see infra 
note 158. 
53  See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(source and object code); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
326–27, judgment entered, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (source code), aff’d sub 
nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (source and object code). 
54  See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189, 194–95 (1983). 
55  Id. 
56 See Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 5 U.S. 661, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010) (holding restrictions on access to a 
“limited public forum” do not offend the First Amendment if they are reasonable and 
viewpoint-neutral). 
57  See Stone, supra note 54, at 192. 
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are concerned, the balancing is categorical and predetermined ra-
ther than case-by-case.58 Thus, under Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech . . . are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”59 The significance of an un-
protected category, therefore, is that the harms resulting from 
speech within the category so consistently and dramatically exceed 
the benefits that courts may predetermine the question of protec-
tion for every future case.60 
At the bottom line, First Amendment coverage means simply 
that a regulation must pass at least one extra test beyond the ordi-
nary rational-basis review if it is going to be upheld.61 If the regula-
tion under challenge cannot pass either strict or intermediate scru-
tiny or a heightened rationality review, then the activity being regu-
lated must pass a test to establish its fit into one of the unprotected 
categories.62 And even if the activity being regulated is shown to 
meet the definition of, for instance, the unprotected category of 
obscenity, the government may still have to reckon with a heigh-
                                                                                                                            
58  See generally Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and 
Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the 
“Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 484–85 (2006) 
(Professor Nimmer used the phrase “definitional balancing” to describe what he thought 
was the appropriate methodology for the United States Supreme Court to use in 
“defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.” However, the Court has never explicitly said that it applies such a 
methodology. Nonetheless, Professor Nimmer found its application implicit in the 
Court’s decisions.). 
59  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added). 
60  The Court in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), declined to extend a 
Chaplinsky-like approach to videos of animal cruelty, and denounced the categorical 
balancing approach in strong language, opting instead for an approach purporting to 
recognize that the various unprotected categories had existed since 1791: “[A]s a free-
floating test for First Amendment coverage, [categorical balancing] is startling and 
dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” 
Id. at 470. Nonetheless, Stevens represents a change of course, as categorical balancing is 
the approach the Court “obviously took to speech protection for so many decades.” 
Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1295 n.1 (2014). 
61  See Schauer, supra note 34, at 1769–70. 
62  Id. 
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tened means-testing if the challenger shows that the regulation op-
erates as a prior restraint.63 
Let me take a moment to elaborate on how established First 
Amendment doctrine might bear on the regulation of CAD files if 
CAD files, categorically, were taken to lie within the First 
Amendment’s coverage. (Note that I am talking about categorical 
coverage rather than the trivial scenario in which CAD files are ca-
tegorically protected.) The point of this aside is to illustrate the hy-
pothetical consequences of coverage if the rules of protection were 
applied at their logical extremes. The point is not to forecast the 
law’s actual development. Instead, I hope to demonstrate the ab-
surd results that judges will be concerned with avoiding as they 
reckon with replicator technologies. 
a) CAD Regulation as Automatic Content Discrimination 
The distinction between “content-based” and “content-
neutral” regulations of speech is a pillar of modern First Amend-
ment doctrine.64 Content-based regulations, of course, are subject 
to a strict scrutiny in which the government’s means must be nar-
rowly tailored to promote a “compelling” government interest.65 
After R.A.V. v. St. Paul,66 content-based regulations are subject to 
strict scrutiny even if the content discrimination takes place within 
an unprotected category.67 In R.A.V., the Supreme Court struck 
down a hate speech ordinance, holding that even though “fighting 
words” made up a proscribable category of speech, the hate speech 
ordinance discriminated on content by regulating racist fighting 
words exclusively; Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the or-
dinance could have avoided the problem by applying the same set 
of rules to fighting words on both sides of the “debate” between 
racists and anti-racists.68 The opinion went on to establish a num-
ber of dodgy exceptions to its rule, at least one of which could con-
                                                                                                                            
63  See infra text accompanying note 96. 
64  See, e.g., Stone, supra note 54, at 189. 
65  See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
66  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
67  Id. at 400. 
68  Id. at 392 (“St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”). 
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ceivably ease the government’s load in certain CAD cases.69 But a 
broad reading of the R.A.V. principle—recall that I am setting out 
the extreme case—indicates that, if CAD is covered, then the gov-
ernment will have to worry about content discrimination even if 
CAD files comprise or otherwise occupy an unprotected category. 
Since its development in the mid-twentieth-century,70 the con-
tent discrimination idea has proved to be reasonably workable. But 
its basic terms remain surprisingly indefinite. Content discrimina-
tion sometimes seems to refer to viewpoint discrimination, in 
which one side of a debate is privileged over another.71 At other 
times, it seems to refer to subject-matter discrimination, in which 
                                                                                                                            
69  I refer, first, to R.A.V.’s “special virulence” exception, which applies when “the 
basis for the content discrimination [within an unprotected category] consists entirely of 
the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” Id. at 388. It is easy 
enough to imagine a circumstance in which CAD files generally were defined as an 
unprotected category due to the excess of physical risk versus speech value, and in which 
the most “dangerous” CAD files might be singled out because they represented the most 
extreme instance of this excess. It is also easy to imagine the logic of Renton’s “secondary 
effects” test, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), discussed infra 
note 77, applied against certain types of CAD files. R.A.V. carves out an exception here, 
too. Id. at 389. The problem, though, is that Renton is traditionally confined in its 
application to sexual speech. Finally, R.A.V. makes an exception to its rule for cases in 
which “the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic 
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.” Id. at 390. Justice Scalia’s bizarre 
example of the phenomenon—he “cannot think of any First Amendment interest that 
would stand in the way of a State’s prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with 
blue-eyed actresses”—makes it hard to say how seriously he or the Court takes this final 
exception to the R.A.V. rule. But it is at any rate sketched in such broad terms that it 
could easily encompass distinctions among CAD files and shield them from R.A.V.’s 
scrutiny if that were how the Court wanted to address the problem. 
70  The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws originates in 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which a Vietnam War protester was 
arrested and convicted of burning his draft card in violation of the Selective Service Act. 
The Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the Act’s prohibition against destroying 
draft cards was not aimed at any expressive political content, but rather at draft card 
destruction generally, an activity that was typically nonexpressive. Because the 
prohibition was “content-neutral,” it received a relatively deferential review that we 
today refer to as intermediate scrutiny. 
71  See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 242–43 
(2012) (“One potential definition is that the government usually cannot discriminate 
among instances of expression on the basis of viewpoint. There is a great deal of 
agreement that viewpoint discrimination is at the core of what the First Amendment 
forbids. A few commentators have gone further to argue that viewpoint discrimination is 
the only impermissible kind. Among members of the Court, Justice Stevens was notable 
for sometimes making this contention.”). 
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an entire topic of discussion is placed off-limits.72 Between these 
two possible modes of content discrimination, it makes sense to 
suppose that viewpoint discrimination should receive closer scruti-
ny than subject-matter discrimination because viewpoint discrimi-
nation is more distortive of public discussion.73 Perhaps viewpoint 
discrimination should always fail strict scrutiny because distorting 
public discussion is always an impermissible governmental pur-
pose.74 But the Supreme Court has left these questions suprisingly 
open.75 
The content-discrimination inquiry at times presents itself as 
an inquiry into motive.76 Thus, in City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres,77 the Supreme Court deemed content-neutral a municipal zon-
ing regulation limiting land use by adult entertainment establish-
ments. Renton’s regulation, which reached theaters showing adult 
content but not other types of content, was, by any intuitive defini-
tion, content-based. Yet the Court held otherwise, reasoning that 
the City was not interested in the ideological content of the films 
being shown, but rather in the “secondary effects” created by adult 
film theaters: prostitution, diminished property values, and so on.78 
So long as the government’s interest was in the secondary effects 
rather than in the expression itself, the law would be treated as con-
tent-neutral. 
                                                                                                                            
72  See id. (discussing how some commentators argue that it is difficult to distinguish 
between subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination, and whether they constitute the 
entirety or just a part of content discrimination). 
73  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by 
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant . . . 
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or 
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); see 
generally Stone, supra note 54. 
74  See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 428 (1996) (discussing that viewpoint 
discrimination is an impermissible government motive for speech restriction). 
75  See id. at 427 (discussing that the “Court has not fully addressed, much less 
resolved, the question” of what motives are impermissible). 
76  See id. at 425 (discussing that some approaches to the content-discrimination 
inquiry involves analysis of motive). 
77  475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
78  See id. at 52. Also see City of Erie v. Pap’s AM, 529 U.S. 277 (2000), for a near-
parody of Renton. 
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In practice, Renton’s “secondary effects” approach to content 
neutrality is generally treated as a “fiction”79 written to justify 
close regulation of erotic expression, and is not applied in any other 
context. Yet Renton is at times cited outside the erotic expression 
context for the proposition that “[t]he First Amendment requires 
heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. . . . 
‘[C]ontent-neutral’ speech regulations are those that are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”80 If this 
were the meaning of content neutrality, then one would expect a 
much clearer and generally more permissive free speech jurispru-
dence in which laws received strict scrutiny only if they discrimi-
nated on viewpoint. Under such an approach, laws that discrimi-
nated even-handedly on the basis of subject matter would presum-
ably be regarded as content-neutral. At times—including in a few 
cases concerning computer code—Renton is invoked to support 
this more deferential approach.81 
But at other times, the Supreme Court has approvingly cited 
Renton’s language on viewpoint discrimination even as they applied 
strict scrutiny to laws having nothing to do with viewpoint at all. In 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,82 for instance, the Supreme Court held 
that a Vermont law regulating the disclosure of pharmacists’ pre-
scription records discriminated not only based on content, but also 
on viewpoint.83 These records, which pharmacists are required to 
keep by law, include data indicating which prescribing doctors have 
prescribed which medications, and how often.84 Pharmaceutical 
companies want this “prescriber-identifying data” so that their 
                                                                                                                            
79  See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
80  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (citations omitted) (quoting, 
inter alia, Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
81  See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329, 
judgment entered, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
82 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
83  See id. at 2663 (“In its practical operation, Vermont’s law goes even beyond mere 
content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.”) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
84  See id. at 2660. 
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sales representatives can hone their pitch to individual prescribing 
doctors.85 Data miners buy the prescription records from pharma-
cies and lease the most useful information to drug companies.86 
Vermont’s legislature, concerned that these sales practices drive 
up health care costs by inducing doctors to pass over generic alter-
natives, enacted a law barring the sale of the data and the disclosure 
of the data “for marketing.”87 By suppressing the exchange of the 
data “for marketing purposes,” wrote Justice Kennedy, Vermont 
had made pharmaceutical representatives’ sales pitches less effec-
tive.88 For Justice Kennedy, this meant that Vermont’s law discri-
minated on content by singling out speech about selling pharma-
ceuticals.89 Indeed, Justice Kennedy wrote that the law had discri-
minated against pharmaceutical representatives on account of their 
“disfavored” viewpoint relative to state-funded advocates of ge-
neric drugs.90 
Justice Kennedy’s version of content and viewpoint discrimina-
tion in IMS Health stretches those terms about as far as they will 
go, and, in my view, further than they should go. (The serious 
charge of “viewpoint discrimination,” in particular, seems to have 
devolved into a laurel to be bestowed on victorious First Amend-
ment challengers.) But Justice Kennedy does not break them, as 
the terms “content,” “viewpoint,” and “discrimination,” much 
like “speech,” are almost infinitely plastic.91 
Recall that my point in this section is to discuss logical ex-
tremes. If we assume that CAD files are all within First Amend-
ment coverage, and if we take IMS Health as representative of the 
broadest possible vision of content discrimination, then any num-
ber of restrictions on CAD files might meet the bill. Some CAD 
files for dangerous articles would surely be regulated more closely 
than others. Some regulations would reach the sale of CAD files 
                                                                                                                            
85  See id. 
86  See id. 
87  See id. 
88  See id. at 2663. 
89  See id. 
90  See id. at 2660, 2680. 
91  See generally Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable 
Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 132–33 (2008) (discussing the 
malleability of terms). 
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but not the sharing of CAD files. Each of these distinctions, like 
Vermont’s law in IMS Health, would address directly the sharing 
of “information” and discriminate based either on what “informa-
tion” is being shared or what purpose that information is being put 
to. It is by no means obvious that any CAD-specific law (short of, 
perhaps, a law outlawing CAD files altogether, which would at any 
rate fail an overbreadth challenge) should be seen as content-
neutral under IMS Health’s principle. 
Supposing, then, that all CAD laws’ content-based regulations 
are considered content-based, they must survive strict scrutiny; 
they must, in other words, promote compelling governmental in-
terests by the narrowest possible means.92 Some CAD laws may 
well get by; the Supreme Court has at times set a low bar for 
“compelling,” a term that approves not only matters of life and 
limb but small-bore interests such as the protection of minors from 
“indecent” magazines.93 But wherever the bar is set, strict scrutiny 
nonetheless invites a close judicial investigation of the challenged 
regulation’s policy merits, and generally spells defeat for the gov-
ernment.94 So while CAD regulations may succeed in certain sen-
sational cases—firearms, for instance—mundane economic regula-
tions likely would not. A major takeaway from the commercial 
speech cases is that the Supreme Court rarely defers to market-
interventive governmental rationales, and often disapproves them 
even under an intermediate standard of scrutiny.95 All economic 
                                                                                                                            
92  See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
93  Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 126 (“We have recognized that there is a compelling 
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest 
extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult 
standards.”). 
94  See id. (“The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve 
those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. It is 
not enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the means must be 
carefully tailored to achieve those ends.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
95  See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
767–70 (1976) (“It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who wishes to provide low 
cost, and assertedly low quality, services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on 
his offer by too many unwitting customers. They will choose the low-cost, low-quality 
service and drive the ‘professional’ pharmacist out of business. They will respond only to 
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regulations, of course, are market interventions, so full First 
Amendment coverage for CAD could invite a skeptical judicial re-
view of almost all manufacturing laws in a replicator economy. 
That review may be especially difficult to pass in the transitional 
years as the government experiments with new policies. 
b) CAD regulation as prior restraint 
If we continue for the sake of argument to entertain the as-
sumption that all CAD files lie within the First Amendment’s cov-
erage, then the prior restraint doctrine does not need any stret-
ching at all to condemn a broad range of CAD laws. The Supreme 
Court has held that “it is the chief purpose of the [First Amend-
ment’s free press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon 
publication.”96 As such, prior restraints are said to carry a “heavy 
presumption against [their] constitutional validity.”97 
The Supreme Court has framed the prior restraint doctrine’s 
origins historically, observing that “the core abuse against which 
[the freedom of speech and press] was directed was the scheme of 
licensing laws implemented by the monarch and Parliament to con-
tain the ‘evils’ of the printing press in 16th- and 17th-century Eng-
land.”98 The premise seems to be that scrutiny against government 
action must be more severe in this “core” of First Amendment 
concern than in any other area.99 Today, of course, the prior re-
straint doctrine reaches a wide and poorly defined range of gov-
ernment action that has next to nothing in common with licensing 
practices. These range from post-conviction injunctions100 to regu-
                                                                                                                            
costly and excessive advertising, and end up paying the price. . . . There is, of course, an 
alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this 
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if 
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them.”) (expressing skepticism that law 
against advertising prescription drug prices helped to maintain a healthy pharmaceutical 
services market); see also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85, 95–96 
(1977) (expressing skepticism about a ban on “for sale” signs as a counter to a spiral of 
“white flight”). 
96  Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). 
97  See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); see also Org. for a 
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations omitted). 
98  Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
99  See id. 
100  See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 713. 
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latory schemes that in their forbidding complexity are said to deter 
speech.101 
A party may challenge a regulatory scheme as a prior restraint: 
whenever a licensing law gives a government official 
or agency substantial power to discriminate based 
on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppress-
ing disfavored speech or disliked speakers. . . . 
[Second,] the law must have a close enough nexus 
to expression, or to conduct commonly associated 
with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat 
of the identified censorship risks.102 
If you grant, again, the assumption that CAD files count as a 
form of expression, then an application of prior restraint doctrine 
to a broad range of CAD regulation becomes extremely 
straightforward. The Cody Wilson incident, for instance, involved 
a demand from the State Department that Wilson submit a set of 
ten CAD files to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC) for classification before continuing to publish them on-
line.103 If CAD files are First Amendment subject matter, then it is 
hard to see a clear distinction between the DDTC’s classification 
scheme and the 16th- and 17th-century press licensing schemes 
that inspired the prior restraint doctrine in the first place.104 In-
deed, the same broadly discretionary International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) scheme cited against Cody Wilson would have 
been characterized as prior restraints in past cases involving the 
                                                                                                                            
101  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (“This 
regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of that term, 
for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek an advisory opinion from the 
FEC before the speech takes place. As a practical matter, however, given the complexity 
of the regulations and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a 
speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending 
against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. 
These onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the 
FEC power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England, 
laws and governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to 
prohibit.”) (citations omitted). 
102  City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988). 
103  See Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of State to Cody Wilson, supra note 25. 
104  Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
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distribution of cryptographic source code.105 And such arguments 
could easily also be made in more mundane contexts. The Federal 
Aviation Administration certifies designs for airplane parts.106 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) licenses pesticides, insec-
ticides and rodenticides.107 The Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
Administration licenses the sale of fireworks.108 
Another aspect of the overall regulatory scheme could also trig-
ger prior restraint analysis. As detailed in Part II, the policing of 
CAD files would most likely involve some variation on the notice-
and-takedown regime currently followed under the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA). Under this model, the government 
would offer Internet service providers and search engines a “safe 
harbor” from liability for noncompliant CADs they hosted or 
linked to, but only so long as they comply with orders to remove 
the offending material.109 (Intellectual property owners have al-
ready pursued infringing CADs fairly aggressively under the 
DMCA’s safe harbor procedure.)110 The Cody Wilson confronta-
                                                                                                                            
105  See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1139, reh’g granted, 
opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The EAR regulations at issue plainly 
satisfy the first requirement—‘the determination of who may speak and who may not is 
left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.’ BXA administrators are 
empowered to deny licenses whenever export might be inconsistent with ‘U.S. national 
security and foreign policy interests.’ No more specific guidance is provided.”) (citation 
omitted). 
106  See GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States, 286 F.3d 1168, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2002). 
107  See Woodstream Corp. v. Jackson, 845 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The 
EPA is directed to approve the registration of a pesticide if, inter alia, ‘(A) its 
composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it; (B) its labeling and other 
material required to be submitted comply with the requirements of this subchapter; (C) it 
will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment; and (D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly 
recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment.’ 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).”). 
108  United States v. Droganes, 728 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Certain acts 
involving ‘explosive materials’ are prohibited by statute, including ‘dealing’ them 
without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1), ‘transporting’ them without a license, [18 
U.S.C.] § 842(a)(3)(A), and ‘distributing’ them to other unlicensed persons, [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 842(a)(3)(B). What constitutes an ‘explosive material,’ in turn, is defined by federal 
regulations.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2287 (2014). 
109  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) (outlining DMCA “safe harbor” protections). 
110  See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement Via 3D 
Printing: It’s No “Use”, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 811–13 
(2013) (discussing Games Workshop’s pursuit of Thomas Valerty, who posted on 
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tion, though it proceeded under ITAR and did not implicate any 
copyright issue, followed a script that closely resembled the 
DMCA’s. 
A number of commentators have argued persuasively that the 
DMCA’s safe harbor provisions result in a “prior restraint by 
proxy” against alleged copyright infringers.111 Every advantage un-
der the notice-and-takedown approach goes to the enforcer. First, 
the notice-and-takedown approach allows the enforcing party to 
deal with infrastructure owners (“online service providers” in the 
DMCA) such as search engines, file-hosting services, and stream-
ing websites rather than with the parties who actually upload the 
offending data.112 This means that in most cases that the enforcer is 
                                                                                                                            
Thingiverse his designs for two small figurines in the style of the tabletop strategy game 
Warhammer 40,000). 
111  See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects 
of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 191 (2010) (“In his early 
and influential review of prior restraint doctrine, Thomas Emerson outlined the key 
characteristics distinguishing prior restraint from subsequent punishment: (1) breadth, (2) 
timing and delay, (3) propensity toward adverse decision, (4) limited procedure, (5) 
limited opportunity for public appraisal and criticism, (6) the “dynamics of prior 
restraint,” (7) certainty and risk, and (8) effectiveness. These elements contribute to 
prior restraint’s particular threat to free expression. The DMCA notice-and-takedown 
regime exhibits similar flaws: (1) Overbreadth: facially conformant but erroneous notices 
routinely prompt takedown; any posted content is potentially susceptible. (2) Delay: the 
ten-to-fourteen-business-day takedown can be timed strategically, to remove speech at 
the time of greatest impact to an ongoing debate. (3) Nearly all general-purpose providers 
take down content almost automatically upon receipt of a conformant notice. (4) The 
poster generally receives no notice or opportunity to respond until after content is taken 
down, and may receive few specifics even then; the only opportunity to contest is through 
counter-notice, which is biased against the poster, or in court. (5) Private actions are even 
less open to public appraisal than those of government censors; the indirect nature of the 
regulation diverts criticism. (6) The posting of information regarding DMCA agents and 
procedures invites their use. (7) The risk involved with filing a counter-notification is 
made to appear greater than the risk of initial posting. (8) On a case-by-case basis, the 
takedown scheme is effective. Almost every instance targeted by a notification is 
removed, and yet, in gross, the system fails to stop infringement of mass content because 
more targets re-appear from new sources.”) (citations omitted). 
112  See Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 119 (2006) (Section 512 of the statute ultimately identified safe 
harbors for five specific categories of OSPs: (1) those involved in ‘transitory digital 
network communications;’ (2) those providing ‘system caching’ services; (3) those 
providing space on their systems or networks for the storage of digital material ‘at the 
direction of users;’ (4) those providing ‘information location tools;’ and (5) nonprofit 
educational institutions providing such services to its faculty and graduate students.); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)–(e) (2012). 
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dealing with a for-profit entity with a return address rather than 
with a relatively anonymous and unpredictable content uploader.113 
Second, notice-and-takedown allows the ISP, a party whose only 
interest is in avoiding litigation, to stand in as an intermediary for 
the interested speaker who is accused of infringement.114 Third, 
because ISPs have every incentive to remove the offending content 
as quickly as possible, the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions mean 
that the matter is closed quickly and outside of court on the basis of 
an allegation and little more.115 If the DMCA’s safe harbor provi-
sions were exported from the copyright context to a state-based 
policing context, the prior restraint concerns would be hard to ig-
nore. 
Once a prior restraint is found, the “heavy presumption” 
against it can still be overcome. “In order to be held lawful, res-
pondents’ action, first, must fit within one of the narrowly defined 
                                                                                                                            
113  See Scott, supra note 111, at 136 (“For example, the ease with which copyright 
holders are able to obtain the identification of alleged infringers threatens the ability of 
individuals to speak anonymously on the Internet. As some commentators have noted, 
‘[T]here are many reasons for anonymity, including political reasons; anonymizing 
services are used by dissidents under oppressive regimes for example.’”). 
114  See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects 
of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 181 (2010) (“The 
service provider is a third-party intermediary on the critical path to online speech. Service 
providers are imperfect agents for their poster-principals. These intermediaries to online 
speech likely have different incentives and risk sensitivities from their users, and the 
additional layer they represent increases information costs. The DMCA plays upon these 
divergences to suppress speech and deprive the public of positive externalities from 
speech.”). 
115  See Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 135 (2006) (“Speaking about the impact of the safe harbors on 
Yahoo!, an in-house counsel for the OSP explained: ‘As a practical matter, notice and 
take down begins and ends the debate over whether a site stays up. Most service providers 
have little incentive to incur the costs and risks of litigation and will opt for the safe 
harbor, taking the site down. Users can provide a “counter notification” giving the 
copyright owner 10 days to obtain a court order to keep the site down, but very few users 
choose this option in Yahoo!’s experience. . . . This may be expedient and efficient, but to 
some extent it represents a “might makes right” resolution that gives little or no 
consideration to the validity of the copyright interest being asserted, its ownership, the 
permissible scope of protection, or defenses such as parody, fair use, de minimis use, and 
so on.”) (quoting BATUR OKTAY & GREG WRENN, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
WORKSHOP ON SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY: A LOOK BACK AT THE NOTICE-TAKEDOWN 
PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT ONE YEAR AFTER THE 
ENACTMENT 17 (1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/
en/osp_lia/osp_lia_2.pdf). 
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exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints.”116 These ex-
ceptions include the regulation of obscenity,117 the protection of 
judicial proceedings,118 and, in theory, protection against imminent 
national security threats.119 Even if the regulation fits into one of 
these exceptional categories, the restraint “must [be] accomplished 
with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing 
constitutionally protected speech.”120 These “procedural safe-
guards” require 1) that the licensing decision be made quickly; 2) a 
prompt judicial review; and 3) that the burden of defending the li-
censing denial in court must be placed on the licensor.121 
If all CAD files are recognized as First Amendment subject 
matter, then the prior restraint doctrine at its limit could invalidate 
almost any licensing or classification requirement in a replicator 
economy as well as the notice-and-takedown procedures that make 
up the most likely approach to enforcement. Even those enforce-
ment measures that could survive scrutiny would come at enorm-
ous cost to the government, which would be forced to defend in 
court almost every adverse exercise of discretion. 
                                                                                                                            
116  Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975). 
117  See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 54 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of 
Chi., 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961). 
118  See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (“[T]he barriers to prior 
restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact. We hold that, 
with respect to the order entered in this case prohibiting reporting or commentary on 
judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers have not been overcome; to the extent 
that this order restrained publication of such material, it is clearly invalid. To the extent 
that it prohibited publication based on information gained from other sources, we 
conclude that the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior restraint was 
not met.”). 
119  See Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 697 (1931) (“No one would question 
but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”). 
120  Se. Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559. 
121  See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (“[W]e determined that 
the following three procedural safeguards were necessary to ensure expeditious 
decisionmaking by the motion picture censorship board: (1) any restraint prior to judicial 
review can be imposed only for a specified brief period during which the status quo must 
be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (3) 
the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear 
the burden of proof once in court.”) (citation omitted) (discussing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 
55–61), overruled on other grounds, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 
780–81 (2004). 
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c) Summing Up the Costs of Coverage 
It would be naive to assume that the nightmare scenarios de-
scribed in subsections a) and b) might actually come to pass even if 
the Supreme Court did ultimately hold that CAD files (and by ex-
tension, computer code) were per se covered under the First 
Amendment. A recent paper, urging a hybrid First-and-Second 
Amendment right to CAD files of guns, argues that “3D CAD files 
of guns are, in truth, nothing more than information—‘pictures of 
guns’ defined in lines of source code, rather than graphic visu-
als . . . Regulation on the 3D CAD source files is really a regulation 
on information, and therefore must satisfy constitutional scruti-
ny.”122 Such arguments, sound only from their own chosen level of 
generalization, ignore everything that actually matters in a consti-
tutional system meant to govern relationships between human be-
ings. CAD files are “nothing more than” information only to the 
same extent that humans are “nothing more than” animals and 
that toxic waste is really just “matter out of place.”123 No judiciary 
would remake the law of products based on an observation that 
CAD files are “really” pictures. 
None of this is to say, however, that the courts will not pay lip 
service to the “picture” theory. Quite the contrary. As I discuss 
below, the trial and appellate courts have nearly unanimously taken 
the position that all computer code “is speech” for First Amend-
ment purposes. The Supreme Court, in another context, has said, 
“[t]his Court has held that the creation and dissemination of in-
formation are speech within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment.”124 Activist litigants in a replicator economy will surely at-
tempt to exploit the replicator’s faint First Amendment salience as 
a pretext to constitutionalize various spheres of economic activity, 
and they will likely acheive a few victories. The “picture” argu-
ment will probably reach the Supreme Court someday, and the Su-
preme Court will likely take it seriously. 
                                                                                                                            
122 Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3d Printed Guns, 81 TENN. 
L. REV. 479, 501–02 (2014). 
123 See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF 
POLLUTION AND TABOO 36 (1966). 
124 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
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At this point, the judiciary will have to explain how, if CAD files 
are First Amendment subject matter, the regulatory state can avoid 
withering under First Amendment scrutiny. The process of “clari-
fication” would no doubt involve uncertain years of new excep-
tions, new categories, and new tests. I see no point in attempting to 
predict the shape of this new doctrine, because at any rate, the 
Court, once it goes down that path, will have premised it on a cru-
cial mistake: namely, the mistake of extending coverage over CAD 
files categorically in the first place. 
In the following sections, I discuss briefly the theoretical argu-
ment in favor of covering CAD categorically, as well as the argu-
ments for exempting CAD categorically from coverage. I then ar-
gue that both approaches are misguided. I then discuss the majority 
position in the courts, which generally favor universal coverage. 
B. Categorical Approaches to CAD and Coverage 
1. Arguments from Resemblance to Natural Language 
CAD files resemble the written word, and their source code is 
more directly human-comprehensible than one might think. The 
prevailing format for 3D modeling in the early 21st century, for in-
stance, is the .stl (Stereo Lithography) format.125 .stl files describe 
three-dimensional shapes as polygonal sets of adjacent triangles in 
a three-dimensional space.126 Because the three-dimensional object 
consists entirely of two-dimensional triangular surfaces, no part of 
the object is truly rounded. Instead, the appearance of a rounded 
surface is always to some degree an approximation. Composing a 
rounded object from a small number of triangles, then, will result in 
a faceted, gemstone-like appearance:127 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
125  See Ennex Corp., STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, FABBERS.COM, 
http://www.ennex.com/~fabbers/StL.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (reprinting 
MARSHALL BURNS, AUTOMATED FABRICATION: IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY IN 
MANUFACTURING § 6.5 (1993)). 
126  See id. 
127  CAD to STL, ISPACE/ARTLAB, http://www.ispaceartlab.com/FabC/cad2stl.html 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 








          128 
Composing the object from a high number of triangles will 
make the facets so small that the 3D printer is incapable of printing 
them “accurately” and the resultant physical object is actually 








    130 
.stl files can be prepared in plain ASCII text, which is easier for 
humans to read but more storage-intensive than the more compact 
“binary” format, which is expressed in ones and zeroes.131 An 
ASCII .stl example of the simplest possible polygon is given below 
(it is unrelated to the illustrations above). For each triangular sur-
face, the file describes a set of vertices as well as a “normal,” a vec-
tor that (perhaps redundantly) describes which face of the triangle 
                                                                                                                            
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Ennex Corp., STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, supra note 125. 
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faces outside the three-dimensional polygon.132 The vertices and 
the normal are all given in Cartesian (x, y, z) coordinates.133 
 
solid example 
facet normal 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
 outer loop 
  vertex 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  vertex 1.0 0.0 0.0 
  vertex 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 endloop 
endfacet 
facet normal 0.0 0.0 -1.0 
 outer loop 
  vertex 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  vertex 0.0 1.0 0.0 
  vertex 1.0 0.0 0.0 
 endloop 
endfacet 
facet normal -1.0 0.0 0.0 
 outer loop 
  vertex 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  vertex 0.0 0.0 1.0 
  vertex 0.0 1.0 0.0 
 endloop 
endfacet 
facet normal 0.577 0.577 0.577 
 outer loop 
  vertex 1.0 0.0 0.0 
  vertex 0.0 1.0 0.0 




                                                                                                                            
132  See CAD to STL, supra note 127. 
133  See id. 
134  See John Burkhardt, ASCII Stereolithography Files, FLORIDA STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF 
SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING, http://people.sc.fsu.edu/~jburkardt/data/stla/stla.html (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
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Again, there is literally no such thing as an .stl script simpler 
than this example. The example shows, though, that the .stl format 
is plain-spoken enough to read at some level without an education 
in any sort of computer science. If you “cheat”135 by counting the 
number of sides described here, you can get the gist of it without 
thinking too hard: you must be looking some sort of four-sided py-
ramid. And you could in a few minutes verify everything else about 
the pyramid—namely, its surfaces’ internal angles and those sur-
faces’ areas relative to each other—with the aid of a pen and paper. 
It is not wholly trivial, then, to describe at least the ASCII .stl files, 
or in principle any other sort of source code, as human-readable 
text. .stl files are writable and viewable in text editors,136 and it may 
often make sense to tweak parts of them in that format. This why 
the human-friendly ASCII format exists.137 
2. Objections from Comprehensibility; the Spence “Test” 
Yet the degree of possible or probable “direct” human inter-
face with these files is obviously sharply limited. CAD files are not 
books. Most users are unlikely ever to read the file’s source code, 
and they would struggle if they tried. A thorough reading even of 
the trivially simple code given above would be far easier through a 
graphical user interface on a computer. It is hard to imagine anyone 
but a savant “reading” even a minimally more complex ASCII .stl 
file and understanding what was going on without help from a 
computer.138 It is highly unlikely (though impossible to verify) that 
anyone has ever written from scratch or read from plain text an .stl 
containing, say, a thousand surfaces. A thousand surfaces, moreo-
ver, is a low number; the simple bottle illustrated below uses 1240 
triangular faces. 
                                                                                                                            
135  I am inclined to think of the side-counting as cheating because the number of a 
polygon’s sides seems to me to drop off in significance as the complexity of a polygon 
increases. Thus, you know most of what you need to know about a four-sided polygon if 
you know that it has four sides, but knowing that a thousand-sided polygon has a thousand 
sides is trivial. The four-sided polygon has to be some sort of pyramid. The thousand-
sided polygon could be a gun receiver or it could be Boba Fett’s helmet. 
136  See John Burkhardt, Humanoid_tri.PNG, FLORIDA STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF 
SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING, http://people.sc.fsu.edu?~jburkardt/data/stla/humanoid_tri
.png (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
137  See id. 
138  See, e.g., id. 
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The fact that most .stl files are in the hard binary rather than 
the easy ASCII format makes this natural comprehension still less 
likely. 
Such are the facts that underlie the most common arguments 
that computer source code “is not speech” for First Amendment 
purposes. One strand of argument would hold that source code 
cannot be speech because the likelihood is so low that anyone in the 
“audience” is capable of understanding its “message.” Dicta from 
the Supreme Court in Spence v. Washington offers some weak sup-
port here, suggesting that speech occurs when “a particularized 
message [is] present, and in the surrounding circumstances the li-
kelihood [is] great that the message be understood by those who 
view[] it.”140 This language is sometimes set out in commentary 
and in lower court opinions—rather surprisingly—as the Supreme 
Court’s “test” to determine what is and what is not speech for 
purposes of the First Amendment.141 
                                                                                                                            
139  John Burkhardt, Bottle, FLORIDA STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING, 
http://people.sc.fsu.edu/~jburkardt/data/stla/bottle.png (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
140  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
141  See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 772–75 
(2001). In fairness, Professor Rubenfeld’s insightful article later acknowledges that Spence 
makes for a “profoundly unsatisfactory” test of expression; I only disagree in that I 
believe Rubenfeld reads and refutes a strawman in Spence where an alternative and more 
reasonable interpretation was available. Specifically, the Spence elements can be read to 
articulate sufficient but not necessary indicia of expression. At any rate, even if Spence had 
been meant as a coverage limit, that limit would have been overruled in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
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But there is no evidence that the Supreme Court ever intended 
Spence to establish an outer boundary for “speech.” When the 
Court has relied on the Spence language, it has always been to af-
firm that expression is present.142 The Court has never suggested 
that failing the Spence “test” means that expression is absent.143 
And rightly so, for if the First Amendment required a high likelih-
ood of comprehension, it would be blind to all sorts of muddled 
messages that the Supreme Court has explicitly blessed with First 
Amendment coverage.144 
It is at any rate unclear which way a “likelihood of understand-
ing” criterion would even cut in a case about computer language. 
The whole point of computer code, whether source code or ma-
chine code,145 is absolute precision.146 The CPU reading machine 
code or the compiler reading source code is designed to follow the 
instructions it receives without variation from the letter.147 A hu-
man reading source code, then, finds a text that contains zero am-
biguity, assuming there are no errors. In many respects, source 
code achieves a clarity that natural language cannot.148 In two early 
                                                                                                                            
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“[A] narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to 
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse 
of Lewis Carroll.” (citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411)). 
142  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
143  Id. 
144  See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 400 (2007) (extending coverage, but not protection, to a banner reading “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS”). 
145  See discussion infra note 158. 
146  See Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 662–
663 (2000). 
147  See id. at 660. 
148  See id. at 662–63 (“Instead of expressing mundane everyday thoughts, programming 
languages express procedures and ideas about procedures without the ambiguity plaguing 
natural languages. For instance, programming languages avoid the difficulties that English 
has in describing algorithms and may stand as the only practical means of expressing 
certain algorithms that require precise articulation. Programming languages provide the 
best means for communicating highly technical ideas—such as mathematical concepts—
within the community of computer scientists and programmers.”). 
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source code cases academics sought to publish encryption source 
code for tutorial purposes in a mathematics journal and on a faculty 
home page.149 If anything, a Spence “test” would seem to find this 
code unusually expressive: a message is intended and it is certain to 
be understood by its audience largely because of, and not in spite of, 
the fact that it is communicated in source code. 
The fact that CAD files are in most instances unlikely to be un-
derstood by human readers, then, is a poor basis to conclude that 
all CAD files lie categorically beyond the coverage or even the pro-
tection of the First Amendment.150 The argument proves far too 
much.151 
3. Objections from Functionality 
A related set of arguments against First Amendment coverage 
for source code has to do with its “functionality.” This argument 
operates by analogy to the “functionality” doctrine of copyright, 
which denies copyright protection to an article’s functional ele-
ments.152 In the famous case of Brandir International, Inc. v. Cas-
cade Pacific Lumber Co.,153 a company sought copyright protection 
for an inventive bicycle rack made of a single length of steam pipe 
bent into an “undulating shape.”154 The company took the position 
that the bike rack was a form of “applied art,” an originally expres-
sive item later put to a utilitarian purpose.155 The court rejected 
this argument, holding that “no artistic element of the RIBBON 
                                                                                                                            
149  See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see 
also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2000); discussion infra note 158. 
150  See Tien, supra note 146, at 678–84. 
151  See Rubenfeld, supra note 141, at 773 (“[Spence’s ‘particularized message’] is a 
profoundly unsatisfactory test for deciding what nonverbal stuff counts as sufficiently 
‘expressive’ to trigger First Amendment scrutiny . . . unless courts are to wall off art as its 
own special First Amendment category to which Spence does not apply—a highly 
unappealing idea, unless you think judges could successfully determine what is and is not 
art—then we are obliged to recognize that the Spence test merely states sufficient, not 
necessary, criteria for determining if conduct is expressive.”). 
152  See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
153  See Brandir Int’l Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
154  See id. at 1147. 
155  See id. 
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Rack [] can be identified as separate and capable of existing inde-
pendently, of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”156 
Software is the best possible illustration of the fact that textual 
and functional properties can inhabit the same article. A whole line 
of cases, for instance, considers arguments that sharing crypto-
graphic source code is the most effective way for computer scien-
tists and mathematicians to communicate with each other about 
cryptographic science.157 Very little of what is communicative in 
this sense is “capable of existing independently of” the functional 
aspects of source code.158 This much is at least as true in the CAD 
context, and that is assuming that we recognize some expressive 
value in a CAD’s source. 
But analogies from copyright to the First Amendment can be 
misleading, as copyright only reaches a subset of First Amendment 
activity. Most notably, copyright requires protected expression to 
contain at least some minimal degree of originality,159 a require-
                                                                                                                            
156  See id. at 1147–48 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001); Junger 
v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2000); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer 
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 
1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
158  I should address two minor points here. First is the distinction between source and 
machine code, which is probably more widely understood today than when the 
cryptography cases were heard, but that nonetheless merits some discussion. When a 
computer’s CPU executes a program, it works with a set of instructions that are written 
in a radically austere language made up of zeroes and ones. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484. 
This is the machine code. It is human-readable in theory but cumbersome. Coders 
therefore write and edit in various more human-readable computer languages such as 
Java, Python, and C, which “compiler” software then translates into an exportable binary 
file. See id. ASCII .stl files, discussed above in discussion surrounding note 125, are 
source, while binary .stl files are objects written in machine code. Most challengers in the 
early First Amendment cases on source code seized on the distinction between source 
and machine code to conclude that source code is not, in fact, functional, but this strikes 
me as overstated. A second point, also raised in the source code litigation, is that source 
code generally contains a number of natural language “comments” to aid human readers. 
See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9. These comments—essentially a programmer’s “note to 
self”—are bracketed off from the rest of the code by ampersands or some other “ignore 
me” flag, and the compiler completely ignores them. See id. But if functionality is what 
matters, the comments can hardly be said to change the equation. 
159  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
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ment that makes no sense in the First Amendment context.160 As 
for the “functionality” doctrine, its purpose in copyright law 
seems to be to guard against misuses of copyright in areas meant to 
belong to patent and trademark.161 It is possible to make a broad 
analogy here; much of this Article, after all, is a warning against the 
expansion of the law of the First Amendment into areas where it 
should not go. But such an analogy would be extremely broad. Most 
legal reasoning is about cordoning off a particular mode of analysis 
to make sure it is not extended over an area where it should not go. 
The fact that functionality is an appropriate boundary for intellec-
tual property cannot imply that it is an appropriate boundary for 
everything else as well. 
Beyond the analogy from copyright, there is no independent 
reason to suppose that a thing’s functionality should be in itself de-
terminative of any First Amendment issue. Functional things are 
used all the time in the service of expression—money,162 sound 
trucks,163 sleeping bags,164 hands.165 It would be an error to suppose 
that the First Amendment shuts off whenever these functional ob-
jects are present in a fact pattern.166 It is a weak criticism of the Su-
preme Court’s campaign-finance jurisprudence, for instance, to say 
that “money is not speech” simply because it is not always used for 
expressive purposes; when money is used to finance expression, 
                                                                                                                            
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
160  See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004) (discussing the “First 
Amendment value of copying” as evidence of a stark conflict between First Amendment 
and copyright priorities). 
161  See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
162  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 301, 365 (2010); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). 
163  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“Fighting words are 
thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a ‘mode 
of speech’; both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim 
upon the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also with fighting 
words: The government may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards 
the underlying message expressed.”) (citation omitted). 
164  See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
165  See Tien, supra note 146, at 683 (“Things that have no utterance meaning, like 
one’s hands, may be used in illocutionary acts.”). 
166  See id. at 685. 
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the First Amendment must at least be in play.167 This point applies 
with equal force in the software context. 
4. General Weaknesses of a Categorical Approach to Code 
and Free Speech 
The resemblance argument as well as the objections from com-
prehensibility and functionality fail because they all assume that the 
coverage question can be determined by certain ontological quali-
ties that are common to all computer code—its textual appearance, 
its mysterious vocabulary, its power to move a CPU. If that were 
the case, then it would make sense to approach code categorically 
for First Amendment purposes: i.e., it is either always covered or 
never covered. 
But expression should not be defined relative to the objects that 
show up in a fact pattern. Without settling on a general definition 
of expression, one can say safely that expression consists in a beha-
vior or an event rather than a thing-in-itself, and that its occurrence 
or nonoccurrence is a highly fact-specific question.168 As Lee Tien 
argued persuasively over a decade ago, there are instances in which 
code is used in the service of a speech act, and there are instances 
in which code is not used in the service of a speech act.169 
Thus, the case of Cody Wilson seems to involve a speech act. 
His intent seems to have been to demonstrate the futility of gun 
control against the Internet.170 Just as importantly, Wilson’s mes-
sage is clearly understood. The gun is more performance art than a 
viable weapon, allegedly prone to catastrophic failure and even in 
its good moments a poor shot.171 The intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard of O’Brien172 fits these facts well. Just as the performative 
                                                                                                                            
167  See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First 
Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables 
speech.”). 
168  See Tien, supra note 146, at 689 n.242. 
169  See generally id. 
170  See Interview by Glenn Beck with Cody Wilson, supra note 33. 
171  This information comes from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Wilson 
disputes it. See Adam Clark Estes, The ATF Has Yet to Be Convinced that 3D-Printed Guns 
Compare to the Real Thing, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://
motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-atf-is-unconvinced-3d-guns-compare-to-real-thing. 
172  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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burning of draft cards in United States v. O’Brien was not a major 
threat to the bureaucracy of the Selective Service Administra-
tion,173 the Liberator taken on its own does not seriously undermine 
international arms regulations. Each is primarily a statement. Each 
is also in violation of a law backed by “a sufficiently important go-
vernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element,”174 and 
can therefore be regulated even under intermediate scrutiny.175 Yet 
each also receives a measure of extra process as called for under the 
free speech principle. This feels appropriate, and more so in almost 
every sense in Wilson’s case than in O’Brien’s. 
And importantly, Wilson’s case (which is unlikely to happen at 
this point) would have been exceptional among the possible litiga-
tion that might someday arise concerning replicated weapons: ex-
ceptional for its politically active plaintiff, and exceptional for the 
fact that it would have come so early in the evolution of the replica-
tor that the gun in question is essentially a novelty item. Extending 
First Amendment coverage to a party in Wilson’s unusual position 
does not need to imply a Lochnerization176 of the entire field of 
CAD. 
Suppose a more mundane party using a fully realized replicator 
in the hypothetical future: one who downloads (or streams) a gun 
precursor just for the sake of owning a gun (let’s say this plaintiff is 
a collector). The replicator builds the gun in a few seconds from 
thin air. Here, there is no intent to make a speech act177 and no con-
text that might lead someone to believe the collector intends a 
speech act.178 It is fully consistent to treat the collector’s claim as 
frivolous and Wilson’s claim as serious. 
Note that the analysis in each of these cases—O’Brien’s and 
the collector’s—would not change even if we assumed a manufac-
turing method that avoided the use of software. This is because the 
textual appearance of CAD is a red herring. The presence of mon-
                                                                                                                            
173  See id. at 377 (upholding the statute against First Amendment challenge as it was “a 
legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the functioning” of the draft system). 
174  See id. at 376. 
175  See id. at 377. 
176  See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
177  See Tien, supra note 146, at 637. 
178  See id. 
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ey or code or any other thing should not add or subtract anything to 
or from the free speech analysis. As Tien observed, “software pos-
es no special First Amendment problems if we resist the impulse to 
treat speech as a thing.”179 But many courts considering the issue 
have shown poor impulse control. 
5. The Temptation to Think Categorically About Code 
It would therefore be an error to assume the First Amendment 
is never in play in cases involving money.180 It would be worse still 
to say that the First Amendment is always in play in cases involving 
money,181 and few lawyers would ever make such a claim.182 But 
code shares with the spoken word a textual aspect that other “ob-
jects” such as money and sound trucks lack. The presence of 
text—text readable, in some cases, by novices—can appear at first 
impression as an unmistakeable marker of speech. On account of its 
textual appearance, the great majority of courts to consider First 
Amendment challenges to regulations of computer code have 
therefore made categorical-sounding statements that “code is 
speech for First Amendment purposes.”183 In Bernstein v. United 
                                                                                                                            
179  See id. at 712. 
180  See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First 
Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables 
speech.”). 
181  Pro se litigants are another matter. For an opinion dismissing a pro se claim 
apparently proceeding on such a full-on “money is speech” theory, see Ballard v. Global 
Tel Link, No. 4:13-CV-974-NAB, 2013 WL 2368983, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 29, 2013) 
(“The named defendants are Global Tel Link, Western Union, and Toyota Motor 
Company. Plaintiff alleges that defendants ‘participated in illegal actions of intentionally 
failing to NOT ask for (verified) personal identification when each defendant debited the 
plaintiff[‘s] bank account.’ Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his First Amendment 
rights, because ‘money is speech’ . . . .”). 
182  For an opinion dismissing a pro se claim apparently proceeding on such a theory, see 
id. 
183  Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“For 
the purposes of First Amendment analysis, this court finds that source code is speech.”); 
see also United States v. Alavi, CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773 (D. Ariz. May 
5, 2008) (“It is true that software source code is speech subject to First Amendment 
protections.”); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 
1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts have found that both the executable object code 
and the more readable source code merit First Amendment protection . . . As with other 
kinds of speech, the scope of the protection for computer code depends upon whether the 
restriction on the code is because of its content.”); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. 
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States Department of State, for instance, a federal district court ex-
plicitly staked out the position that the First Amendment con-
cerned all writings in any language, and that programming languag-
es and machine code alike are for First Amendment purposes lan-
guages.184 And in Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, the court 
went so far as to say that “[i]t cannot seriously be argued that any 
form of computer code may be regulated without reference to First 
Amendment doctrine.”185 
It is not always clear where these statements lie individually on 
the spectrum of authority from dicta to holdings, as many of the 
broadest assertions of coverage come in the context of opinions 
that nonetheless decline to extend protection to the challenger’s 
code.186 In these opinions, which extend coverage while withhold-
ing protection, it may be that the judge writing the opinion is taking 
the path of least resistance. Treating the First Amendment claim as 
wholly frivolous would invite a more aggressive appeal, and espe-
cially so when, as in the early cryptography cases, the challenging 
party is looking to make new law.187 “Acknowledging” that code is 
categorically speech may help the First Amendment challenger to 
save face. For these reasons there is rarely any incentive for a judge 
to make a negative coverage determination, as the same negative 
result can always be reached, and with an appearance of greater 
even-handedness, simply by declining to extend protection. Even 
in cases where First Amendment challengers have lost on the ques-
                                                                                                                            
Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Computer software is expression that is protected 
by the copyright laws and is therefore ‘speech’ at some level, speech that is protected at 
some level by the First Amendment.”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“It cannot seriously be argued that any form of 
computer code may be regulated without reference to First Amendment doctrine.”). 
184  Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1426. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit made a point of 
walking this position back. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“We emphasize the narrowness of our First Amendment holding. We do not 
hold that all software is expressive.”). 
185  Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326–27 (“It cannot seriously be argued that any form 
of computer code may be regulated without reference to First Amendment doctrine.”). 
186  See, e.g., id. 
187  The electronic-rights advocacy organization Electronic Frontier Foundation 
represented challengers in the Junger and Bernstein cases. See All EFF’s Legal Cases, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/cases (last visited Oct. 5, 
2014). 
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tion of protection, then, the trend has been to enlarge the scope of 
coverage. 
In other cases, First Amendment challengers have won on the 
question of protection. Here, too, we see affirmative determina-
tions on the question of coverage, as coverage is a prerequisite to 
protection.188 These affirmative determinations do not have to go 
beyond the facts of the case, and in at least some opinions, courts 
have taken care to avoid making any sweeping judgments about the 
speechness of code at large.189 But for the most part, courts extend-
ing protection to specific instances of code speech have not bothered 
to hold back on the question of coverage.190 
Over time, then, we have seen far more judicial language sug-
gesting that the First Amendment reaches all computer code than 
language suggesting the First Amendment reaches only some com-
puter code.191 The net effect of these opinions has been to push 
coverage outward and set an expectation that where computers go, 
the First Amendment will follow.192 It is a fine example of a general 
phenomenon that Professor Schauer has described as “the magnet-
ism of the First Amendment,”193 in which the range of cases we 
perceive as involving a constitutional free speech issue is constantly 
undergoing expansion. 
                                                                                                                            
188  See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449–50 (2d Cir. 2001). 
189  See, e.g., Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139; see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 449–50 (“Having 
concluded that computer code conveying information [to human readers] is ‘speech’ within 
the meaning of the First Amendment, we next consider, to a limited extent, the scope of 
the protection that code enjoys.”) (emphasis added). 
190  See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
191  See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 445–46 (“Communication does not lose constitutional 
protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is expressed in the language of computer code. 
Mathematical formulae and musical scores are written in ‘code,’ i.e., symbolic notations 
not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet both are covered by the First Amendment. 
If someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using strings of 1’s 
and 0’s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be no different for 
constitutional purposes than if it had been written in English.”). 
192  See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 
1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts have found that both the executable object code 
and the more readable source code merit First Amendment protection . . . As with other 
kinds of speech, the scope of the protection for computer code depends upon whether the 
restriction on the code is because of its content.”); Alavi, 2008 WL 1989773, at *1 (“It is 
true that software source code is speech subject to First Amendment protections.”). 
193  Schauer, supra note 34, at 1787. 
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The excessive tendency in the source code cases is captured 
well in the Northern District of California’s early opinion in 
Bernstein v. United States Department of State: 
Language is by definition speech, and the regulation 
of any language is the regulation of speech. Nor 
does the particular language one chooses change the 
nature of language for First Amendment purposes. 
This court can find no meaningful difference be-
tween computer language, particularly high-level 
languages as defined above, and German or French. 
All participate in a complex system of understood 
meanings within specific communities. Even object 
code, which directly instructs the computer, oper-
ates as a “language.” When the source code is con-
verted into the object code “language,” the object 
program still contains the text of the source pro-
gram. The expression of ideas, commands, objec-
tives and other contents of the source program are 
merely translated into machine-readable code . . . 
Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even 
technical information about hydrogen bomb con-
struction, are often purely functional; they are also 
speech.194 
                                                                                                                            
194  Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citation 
omitted). See also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme 
Court has expressed the versatile scope of the First Amendment by labeling as 
“unquestionably shielded” the artwork of Jackson Pollock, the music of Arnold 
Schoenberg, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian 
& Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). Though unquestionably expressive, these 
things identified by the Court are not traditional speech. Particularly, a musical score 
cannot be read by the majority of the public but can be used as a means of communication 
among musicians. Likewise, computer source code, though unintelligible to many, is the 
preferred method of communication among computer programmers. Because computer 
source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about 
computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.”); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“It 
cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code may be regulated without 
reference to First Amendment doctrine.”) (striking, via a content-neutrality argument, a 
DMCA provision against trafficking in DRM circumvention technologies); Sony 
Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that object code may be copyrighted as expression under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
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You can sense that these judges feel they have drafted forward-
looking opinions by keeping an open mind about emerging technol-
ogy. The irony is that their broad statements to the effect that code 
“is” speech tend to operate on blind analogies to paper media.195 It 
is sometimes tempting to assume, after decades of expansion in 
First Amendment doctrine, that anything at all that might be put 
on paper—or perhaps in copyright’s “tangible medium of expres-
sion”196—must be at least covered, if not protected, by the First 
Amendment. This is, of course, a bad instinct, not least because the 
First Amendment completely ignores huge swaths of communica-
tion, as I have discussed above.197 But the instinct also fails because 
it places too much emphasis on the tangible medium as a store of 
rights. When Judge Patel in Bernstein characterizes machine-
handled object code as expression, she reifies something that 
should be thought of as an act, making speech into something that 
can be kept somewhere, whether in electronic storage media or in a 
book, and that enjoys passive rights as a thing-in-itself.198 But even 
a book is not speech when it is used as a doorstop or as an imple-
ment for hitting someone over the head. Speech is not found in ob-
jects. Equating information storage media with constitutional 
speech may well have been a harmless conceit in the year 1900, 
when data storage or transmission by paper was always part of a 
speech act, and it may have appeared harmless in the 1990s when 
Bernstein came down. But it is extremely problematic today, when 
the overwhelming majority of data transmission and storage 
throughout the world consists of object code, and when we have 
the ability to reduce all “information,” including the roughly three 
                                                                                                                            
(2012)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); see also Elcom, 203 F. Supp. at 1126 (“While 
there is some disagreement over whether object code, as opposed to source code, is 
deserving of First Amendment protection, the better reasoned approach is that it is 
protected. Object code is merely one additional translation of speech into a new, and 
different, language.”). 
195  See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. at 1131.  
196  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
197  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
198  See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435. 
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gigabytes stored on the human DNA molecule,199 to a common 
coin.200 
It is important to consider that Bernstein, Karn, Junger, Rei-
merdes and the few other software opinions were written in an 
economy bearing even less of a resemblance to the replicator econ-
omy I have hypothesized throughout this piece. Each of those cases 
dealt with either academics or hobbyists, and they were infre-
quent.201 They went to perceivedly marginal issues—namely, cryp-
tography and DRM cracking.202 In a replicator economy, the First 
Amendment challenges would come more frequently, and they 
would put far more at stake. A categorical approach to CAD files, 
whether it extends or withholds First Amendment coverage, will 
not do in the long run. 
II. WHY POLICING OF REPLICATION CANNOT SIDESTEP THE 
INTERNET 
Before I reach the final section of this paper, I want to put to 
rest any hope that replicative manufacturing might be regulated in 
a way that avoids the CAD question and its entanglements. 
Think of replication as a two-step process: first, you download 
or otherwise call up the CAD that you need, and second, you man-
ufacture the tangible object from the CAD. To the extent that rep-
licators present a new speech issue, it concerns the first step. Now, 
to be sure, it is fully possible for a tangible object to contain expres-
                                                                                                                            
199  Nova, Genome Facts, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/genome/facts.html 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
200  See R. Polk Wagner, The Medium is the Mistake: The Law of Software for the First 
Amendment, 51 STAN. L. REV. 387, 403 (1999) (“The First Amendment is not about the 
canonization—via constitutional status—of what can be printed out on paper, but about 
preventing the government from proscribing expression—regardless of form—because of 
disapproval of the ideas expressed. Focusing on formalistic categories such as the written 
and spoken word is not only inconsistent with the core values of the First Amendment, 
but may also result in the limiting of other forms of expression, especially new media 
technologies.”). 
201  See, e.g., Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1426 (mathematician); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 
481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000) (law professor); Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 1 
(D.D.C. 1996) (hobbyist). 
202  See, e.g., Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1426 (cryptography); Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (DRM cracking). 
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sive value whether it is replicated or whittled. But a statue pro-
duced by a replicator is neither more nor less expressive in light of 
its material origin. Its expressive qualities have nothing to do with 
the replication process. It is therefore hard to imagine even a bad 
argument that the manufacturing half of the replication process 
involves a speech issue. It is, on the other hand, quite easy to im-
agine the arguments, flawed as they are, that would lead someone 
to say the first half of the process—the downloading or writing of a 
CAD file—constitutes a form of speech. 
One might argue, then, that the regulatory state should strive to 
police the second step as opposed to the first step—the manufac-
turing as opposed to the downloading—in order to avoid stepping 
on activity that carries even the aura of expressiveness. That sort of 
strategy is likely to fail. The regulatory state in a replicator econo-
my will of necessity be deep in the business of regulating code, 
making the speech question unavoidable. 
A. The Futility of Traditional Policing Against a Diffuse Point of 
Manufacture 
Suppose that a design for a cigarette lighter poses a safety ha-
zard to children. Today, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion can order a recall and establish standards preventing lighters 
with the design defect from being manufactured and sold in the fu-
ture.203 In a pre-replicator world, it is hard to imagine, going for-
ward, that the defective lighters will continue to be manufactured 
on a large scale in the United States. The new standard will most 
likely be observed. 
The efficacy of such a regulation owes almost everything to the 
fact that pre-replicator industrial manufacturing entails large fixed 
costs that can only be covered by a large-scale operation.204 The 
market for any given commodity will only carry as many firms as 
can operate at this minimum efficient scale.205 These firms com-
prise an oligopoly in which there are few enough domestic points of 
                                                                                                                            
203  See 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (2012) (establishing CPSC authority to promulgate standards); 
Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 16 C.F.R. § 1210 (2012) (establishing child safety 
certification standards for cigarette lighters). 
204  See discussion supra Introduction. 
205  See id. 
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manufacture that the matter will be relatively easy for regulators to 
monitor. Even assuming that defective merchandise does not bear 
any clear mark identifying its manufacturer, it should be possible to 
trace the chain of distribution and manufacture to the source. 
At the same time, the investment sunk into manufacturing and 
selling a run of lighters will tend to run high enough to incent man-
ufacturers to stay informed of the relevant code. Given the scale of 
the operation and the scope of the accompanying risk, a rational 
and informed manufacturer would usually rather comply than risk a 
recall. 
Things play out very differently if people are producing defec-
tive lighters on a small scale in millions of home replicators at zero 
or near-zero cost. Monitoring millions of home replicators is nei-
ther desirable nor feasible. 
Nor is the designer of the lighter’s CAD precursor (let alone 
the actual end-user replicating the thing at home) as likely to track 
the legal standards as a conventional manufacturer would. Such a 
designer’s operation will be on a smaller scale, reducing the de-
signer’s incentive and ability to self-inform. This will be especially 
true in the case of a casual “prosumer”206 designer who either does 
not seek a profit or who, perhaps, is paid untrackably.207 
Consider the transformation of the journalism industry follow-
ing the spread of Internet access. The traditional subscription-
based mode of compensation presumes a set of technological limi-
tations and fixed costs that impose limits on access and barriers to 
entry. Those traditional technological limitations thin the market to 
a small number of geographically proximate and well-capitalized 
newspaper publishers.208 In such a market, even local papers have 
both the resources and the incentive to invest in investigative re-
porting. Once the technological limits are eliminated—that is, once 
                                                                                                                            
206  JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, 
THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 135 (2014). 
207  Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon is an influential fictional portrayal of an effort to 
create an untrackable virtual currency. See NEAL STEPHENSON, CRYPTONOMICON (2012). 
Dark Wallet, now in development, is a real-life attempt to make the virtual currency 
Bitcoin untrackable. Andy Greenberg, “Dark Wallet” Is About to Make Bitcoin Money 
Laundering Easier Than Ever, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/
dark-wallet/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
208  See Rifkin, supra note 7. 
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“news” is available for free and once Internet publishers are able to 
publish at radically decreased cost—the market becomes less oli-
gopolistic and more “efficient.”209 The old subscription pricing 
model mostly drops out and is replaced with a new trickle of online 
advertising revenues which, as any college microeconomics text-
book would predict, approach marginal cost and eliminate the prof-
it margin in the process.210 Newspapers must now cut costs to re-
store the profit margin. A news market emerges in which light 
journalism is free and plentiful but investigative journalism is 
scarce and on a pay-to-read basis.211 
Barring some dramatic market intervention, it is easy to see the 
same dynamic playing out in the manufacturing sector. The intro-
duction of low- or zero-cost manufacturing would tend to produce 
a highly populated market favoring small and light firms that unde-
rinvest in research, development, and quality control: a cheaper 
market for consumers, but a flimsier one. Already, an experimental 
Zippo-type lighter is available on Thingiverse, where the designer’s 
description includes the following notice: 
Did I mention this print is probably extremely dan-
gerous since plastic for the most part is flamma-
                                                                                                                            
209  See id. 
210  John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney & R. Jamil Jonna, Monopoly and 
Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism, MONTHLY REVIEW (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://monthlyreview.org/2011/04/01/monopoly-and-competition-in-twenty-first-
century-capitalism/#fn48 (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (“As billionaire Warren Buffett, the 
voice of monopoly-finance capital, declared in February 2011: ‘The single most important 
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only newspaper in town, up until the last five years or so, you had pricing power and you 
didn’t have to go to the office and worry about management issues.’”) (quoting Andrew 
Frye & Dakin Campbell, Buffet Says Pricing Power More Important Than Good Management, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-02-
18/buffet-says-pricing-power-more-important-than-good-management.html). 
211  Investigative journalism still takes place at a number of large-scale media 
organizations, but the share of expenditures put toward investigative journalism is lower: 
a “synergy” of mergers. See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on 
Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 906 (2002) (“A likely ‘synergy’ of media mergers is to 
reduce resources committed to investigative journalism. Each outlet of the merged firm 
can often sell the same investigative journalism, the same exposes, thereby reducing the 
total amount the merged firm needs to spend on information gathering.”). 
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ble? . . . I’m fairly certain this is a major fire hazard. 
Fill something flammable with flammable liquid and 
light it on fire? Probably not a good idea, but make it 
and see! It is not my fault if you burn down a small 
town due to inability to use common sense in the 
construction of this lighter.212 
In short, the replicator’s diffusing of the point of manufacture 
and scaling down of the cost of production will weaken much of the 
traditional manufacturing-based regulatory model in ways already 
glimpsed in the copyright wars.213 At the same time, a diffuse point 
of manufacture will exacerbate many of the same policy problems 
that these regulations are designed to address. A sense of crisis will 
likely manifest itself in numerous areas at roughly the same time: 
consumer safety, environmental controls, arms controls, export 
and import controls, and so on. 
B. The Futility of Device-Based Digital Rights Management 
Early attempts at policing are likely to follow the same patterns 
as those made by the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) and Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
in the early days of file sharing at the turn of the 21st century.214 In 
particular, we are likely to see attempts to impose software or 
hardware restrictions on the capability of replicator users to print 
certain types of designs. In the copyright wars, these sorts of re-
strictions have been known as “digital rights management” 
(DRM).215 DRM might operate to ensure that the consumer’s me-
                                                                                                                            
212  Caboose, Open Lighter, THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com/thing:190597 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
213  See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2005). 
214  See generally Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Piracy with Novel 
Digital Rights Management Technology, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 
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215  See Burk, supra note 213, at 538–39 (“While the proliferation of digital technology 
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dia were usable only for a fixed period of time,216 or they might op-
erate as “copy protection” in an attempt to prevent users from 
sharing their media with their friends or on the Internet.217 DRM 
                                                                                                                            
distribution that digital formats invite. By essentially transforming public goods back into 
private goods, owners of intellectual property may introduce into the design of digital 
media the more congenial constraints of more traditional media. Indeed, the constraints 
imposed by DRM may, in some cases, be designed to exceed those of traditional 
media.”). 
216  These include Cartrivision, a failed videocassette rent-by-mail format from the early 
1970s that only the factory could rewind for a second viewing, see Charlie Sorrel, 1972 
VCR Offered ‘Analog Rights Management,’ WIRED (July 1, 2008, 3:25 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2008/07/1972-vcr-offere/, DivX, a failed rival to DVDs in the 
late nineties that would phone in to and ask permission from a central server before 
playing a video, thus ensuring that the purchaser could only watch the purchased video 
for a fixed period, see Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of 
Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 76 (2006), and EZ-D, a failed Disney rental disc that 
would physically self-destruct—no kidding!—48 hours after the user opened its airtight 
packaging, Eric A. Taub, DVD’s Meant for Buying but Not for Keeping, N.Y. TIMES (July 
21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/21/technology/21FLEX.html. Each of 
these was an attempt to avoid the copy-prone model of traditional video stores such as 
Blockbuster, which attempted its own DRM-enabled fixed-period download service 
before folding completely in 2013. See Greg Sandoval, Blockbuster Acquires Movielink, 
CNET NEWS (Aug. 8, 2007, 6:50 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Blockbuster-acquires-
Movielink/2100-1026_3-6201609.html; Todd Leopold, Your Late Fees Are Waived; 
Blockbuster Closes, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013, 9:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/
tech/gaming-gadgets/blockbuster-video-stores-impact/. 
217  These include the Audio Home Recording Act-mandated Serial Copy Management 
System, an encoding technique to degrade the fidelity of homemade Digital Audio Tape 
recordings, see 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (“No person shall import, manufacture, 
or distribute any digital audio recording device . . . that does not conform to the Serial 
Copy Management System [or] a system that has the same functional characteristics.”), 
various technologies that prevented late-90s audio CDs from being ripped until teenagers 
figured out you could get around it if you made a ring around the edge of the disk with a 
Sharpie, see John Leyden, Marker Pens, Sticky Tape Crack Music CD Protection, THE 
REGISTER (May 14, 2002), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/14/marker_pens_
sticky_tape_crack/, iTunes’ “FairPlay” restriction (later removed in 2009) that its 
proprietary-format .aac music files could only be copied onto five devices and no more, see 
Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., C05-00037 JW HRL, 2011 WL 976942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 21, 2011), the Wal-Mart music store’s DivX-like requirement, see supra note 213, 
that the listener seek reauthorization from a Wal-Mart server every time a song is ported 
to a new operating system or device, a restriction that rendered many such files 
unplayable forever when Wal-Mart ceased supporting them, see Bruce Houghton, 
Walmart Shutting Down DRM Download Servers, HYPEBOT.COM (June 1, 2009), http://
www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2009/06/walmart-shutting-down-drm-download-servers
.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2014), and the video game Assassin’s Creed 2, which would 
constantly ping an official server for permission to keep running and would shut down in 
the middle of a game without giving the player a chance to save if ever the Internet 
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techniques today are often used to force users to download security 
updates or to prevent owners from installing disapproved software 
on their smart phones or other devices.218 
A state DRM strategy219 for regulating replication could take a 
few forms. A fully centralized, highly aggressive approach would 
mean that regulating authorities would flag conforming files as 
“approved,” and then replicators would be authorized only to 
print approved files. This approach would more or less conform to 
the one taken by Apple with its devices: new software is available 
through the officially sanctioned “App Store,” and the device’s 
owner lacks administrative privileges to install software through 
any other means.220 A slightly less aggressive approach would re-
semble that taken by antivirus and filtering software: a central ser-
vice daily distributes lists of “blocked” sources. Presumably, repli-
cator users under this scheme would also lack administrative privi-
leges and be forced to download the daily update in order to keep 
using the device. A still less-aggressive approach would involve 
firmware that scanned for certain types of shapes, such as guns, and 
refused to print them. One firm’s 3D printers already follow this 
approach.221 
Such tactics have a mixed record. The copyright wars have 
shown that DRM measures are almost always cracked by sophisti-
cated users soon after they hit the market, and that unsophisticated 
                                                                                                                            
connection went down for a couple of minutes or if, as eventually occurred, the server 
crashed, see Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 
TENN. L. REV. 235, 261–62 (2013). 
218  See Michael K. Cheng, IPhone Jailbreaking Under the DMCA: Towards A 
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220  See Cheng, supra note 218. 
221  See Adi Robertson, Plastic Piracy: DRM Won’t Cripple 3D Printing, THE VERGE 
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users learn almost as quickly to Google, download, and apply the 
crack that the sophisticated users have developed.222 
DRM also creates security vulnerabilities by reserving access 
for an official external administrator. Attackers can exploit this 
back channel if they find the keys to administrator access. In one 
particularly awful instance, Sony BMG in the early 2000s packaged 
millions of its CDs with “rootkit” software that established a hid-
den and remotely manageable file folder on users’ computers.223 
BMG used the rootkit to monitor customers’ listening habits.224 
Users who run up against DRM limitations tend to take offense 
at the idea that they have been “locked out” of their own stuff.225 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a perennial and outspoken 
opponent of DRM, has adopted the slogan, “you bought it, you 
                                                                                                                            
222  See James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1755–56 (2005) 
(“The list of famous failures of DRM systems is long. The system used to control the 
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223  See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the Disaster: 
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158–64 
(2007). 
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own it.”226 Make magazine’s “Maker’s Bill of Rights” is more to 
the point: “If you can’t open it, you don’t own it.”227 This view of 
ownership, which would oppose DRM on property-rights grounds, 
is more polemical than doctrinal; as any first-year law student 
knows, “ownership” is a bundle of rights that is fully conceptually 
severable into whatever portfolio of access two contracting parties 
might bargain for.228 But even standardized contracts of adhesion 
can change under pressure from popular expectations about the 
meaning of ownership. After years of criticism and poor results, 
many of the major media merchants have backed off of the most 
obnoxious DRM controls229 and accepted some loss of control over 
the distribution of copyrighted materials as a fact of life. 
C. The Limited Potential of Voluntary Measures 
If traditional policing and DRM-based policing are ruled out as 
impracticable and direct policing of CAD files is ruled out as con-
stitutionally suspect, then voluntary compliance is all that remains. 
To encourage voluntary compliance, the state might circulate advi-
sory blacklists and “seals of approval” and invite users to follow its 
lead. A closely managed Thingiverse of safe and effective designs 
could easily become a path of least resistance for casual replicator 
users, and that counts for a lot: against everyone’s expectations, 
the iTunes music market proved in the 2000s that people will often 
pay money for music if doing so is even slightly more convenient 
than downloading it for free. But voluntary measures have limits. 
They would not reach users who were determined to replicate non-
compliant designs, and isolated instances of noncompliance in 
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areas such as product safety could still impose significant external 
harms on others.230 
D. Resorting to Code-Based Policing 
If DRM avenues produce the same mixed results that they have 
in the copyright wars, and assuming that voluntary measures are 
not always good enough, then the only viable approaches available 
to regulators will have to involve the regulation of code itself rather 
than of the manufacturing process. Imagine a law that imposed a 
fine for manufacturing a non-code-compliant lighter on your home 
replicator but not for downloading the lighter’s CAD.231 Set aside, 
in the first place, the likely objection that the end-user is probably 
the wrong target for such a law. It is hard to imagine how such a 
law could be enforced with any consistency unless your home rep-
licator itself was either hobbled by DRM or subject to constant sur-
veillance by an outside administrator. Without those technological 
controls, illicit lighters might still occasionally be discovered by 
chance at garage sales and so on, and prosecutors could seek 
enormous penalties to compensate for the low detection rate, the-
reby enhancing the deterrent effect; but if the point of regulating 
manufacturing rather than code is to avoid conflicts with personal 
liberties, then we have at this desperate point completely defeated 
the purpose of the exercise. 
It should be clear at this point that there is no realistic way to 
regulate the production of goods on home replicators without at 
some point penalizing or restraining the distribution of CAD files 
themselves on the Internet. 
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III. WAYS FORWARD 
As I have explained above, the regulation of replicative manu-
facturing will have to involve the regulation of CAD files.232 Given 
the high material stakes and the minimal expressive stakes, the 
First Amendment should not place the general constitutionality of 
these regulations in doubt. The courts’ primary agenda in the rep-
licator cases will therefore be to ensure that the presence of CAD 
in a fact pattern does not in itself trigger First Amendment protec-
tion. But there are good and bad paths to that endpoint. 
The bad paths mostly make the common mistake of measuring 
the First Amendment’s scope ontologically. Under these ap-
proaches, the question would become whether computer code, as a 
thing in itself, is First Amendment subject matter.233 This is the 
wrong question to ask. CAD files can be used in the service of 
speech but they do not comprise speech in themselves.234 
It will be said in objection, of course, that CAD files fall into 
some category such as “communication” or “data” or “informa-
tion,” and that “information,” for example, “is speech.” But I 
find it doubtful that all actual spoken speech “is speech” in the con-
stitutional sense, much less “information,” a term so capacious 
that it could describe almost any phenomenon in the universe. The 
First Amendment is a social formula, not a language game, and 
when we resort to a constitutional boundary drawn relative to 
terms such as “communication” or “language,” “we have got on 
to slippery ice.”235 A stare of disbelief is, in my view, the only effec-
tive reply to a person who truly believes their laptop is engaged in 
free speech as it scans for a device driver. 
                                                                                                                            
232  See supra Part II. 
233  See supra Part II.B.5. 
234  See supra Part II.B.1. 
235 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 107 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
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Granting that CAD is not in itself speech, then, there will still 
be cases in which the suppression of CAD—or sound trucks, or 
money, or sleeping in the park—will burden speech. But there will 
be other cases in which the suppression of CAD raises no speech 
issue at all.236 A truly categorical approach to the CAD question, 
then, would either Lochnerize an entire growing sector of the econ-
omy because of code’s basicresemblance to text, or otherwise de-
privilege a scattered class of speakers who might use CAD to illu-
strate their point. I do not expect the Supreme Court to make ei-
ther of these hamhanded mistakes. 
Yet I am not entirely optimistic that courts will consistently 
take the good path, which is to treat the presence of CAD in a fact 
pattern as a red herring that in itself neither adds nor subtracts ex-
pressive value. As Professor Wagner put it at the turn of the cen-
tury in an effective critique of the categorical approach to software 
and speech, “the best law of software is no law of software.”237 
The concern is what kind of claims might arise in that vacuum, 
where various interest groups can be expected to press First 
Amendment opportunities from time to time in the absence of any 
clear discouragement from the Court. And it is hard to imagine 
what clear discouragement would look like, short of the blunt, stu-
pid “CAD is not speech” approach that courts managed to avoid 
in the last round of First Amendment litigation surrounding soft-
ware.238 The Supreme Court, after all, has never developed any 
broader theory of coverage, and probably never can.239 
Should the court manage a truly neutral approach to the CAD 
question, we are sure to see at least some case law that legitimately 
extends First Amendment coverage, and at times protection, to 
deserving parties who are engaged in some genuine form of expres-
sion involving CAD. (To the extent that software generally 
presents the same issues as CAD specifically, the cryptography 
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cases of the late nineties already serve this purpose.)240 Absent a 
strong general definition of expression, these isolated cases will ac-
cumulate into a bank of precedent for parties who would press 
broad, aggressive First Amendment theories—“the Supreme 
Court has previously held in A v. B that CAD files are ‘speech’ for 
First Amendment purposes”—in the manufacturing context. Such 
claims are likely to persist even if the courts take care to avoid en-
couraging them. 
For example, the Second Circuit largely managed to avoid a ca-
tegorical analysis when it confronted the software question at the 
turn of the century. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, it ex-
tended First Amendment coverage (but not protection) to the 
source code for DeCSS, a decryption program designed to circum-
vent DRM software affixed to DVDs.241 The defendant owned 
2600: The Hacker Quarterly, and had posted the source code to the 
magazine’s website.242 Eight movie studios had sued under DMCA 
anti-circumvention provisions.243 
The court took a measured approach to the coverage issue, ac-
knowledging three ways in which software might communicate: 
“to the user of the program (not necessarily protected) . . . to the 
computer (never protected),”244 and finally, “a third manner in 
which a programmer might communicate through code: to another 
programmer.”245 (This third manner was presumably “pro-
tected.”)246 
Then, in dicta, the court noted mildly that “[e]ven dry infor-
mation, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expres-
sion, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”247 Years 
later, in separate litigation, counsel for IMS Health, a data-mining 
firm looking to extend First Amendment protection to its singularly 
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“dry” informational product,248 seized on this language, which the 
Second Circuit expanded into a circle of protection for “dry” in-
formation in general: “The First Amendment protects ‘[e]ven dry 
information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic ex-
pression.’ Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 
(2d Cir. 2001). . . . Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 446–49 
(computer program is speech).”249 
The court went on to strike down on First Amendment 
grounds a Vermont law against the sale of pharmacy prescriber da-
ta or its disclosure for marketing purposes.250 The Supreme Court, 
as discussed supra, later affirmed this opinion, and in doing so ex-
tended exotic Lochner-esque251 immunities to a huge range of ex-
pressionless data commodities. 
I should not overstate my point here, as IMS Health would 
surely have gone the same way with or without Corley. Neverthe-
less, the point stands. Substantive language from Corley, an opinion 
that goes out of its way to avoid a categorical approach to software, 
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managed to become the centerpiece of the coverage discussion at 
both the district and the circuit levels in IMS Health, and finally 
migrated into a Supreme Court precedent that envisions an almost 
singularly categorical approach to the First Amendment status not 
just of software, but of “dry information” generally. Corley’s cau-
tious theoretical concession to a publisher engaged in actual ex-
pression became by any measure a cashable resource for a nonex-
pressive business interest advancing something much broader. 
These stories are bound to repeat themselves many more times 
as our technology continues on the slope toward zero-marginal-cost 
manufacturing and as the market for things becomes a market for 
information. The growing “informational” aspect of commerce 
will present seemingly boundless opportunities for First Amend-
ment challengers. But it must be remembered that the whole un-
iverse, at a high enough level of generalization, is “information.” 
Berkeley grasped this point centuries ago when he postulated that 
every object in the universe was an idea in the mind of God.252 Car-
roll’s Red Queen253 and The Matrix’s central mainframe254 are in 
possession of similar “informational” goods. These are powerful 
and beautiful insights. But they are worse than worthless to the 
project of a coherent legal system. 
Pragmatism will ultimately exert a brake on First Amendment 
protections in the replicator economy. I have taken it as a given 
that the courts will allow most of the regulatory state to live on 
(with, perhaps, the occasional indulgence to certain commercial 
interests), even if that means regulating the distribution of certain 
CAD files on the Internet. But it matters how the courts get there. 
As I have argued throughout this Article, the best way forward is to 
ignore coverage arguments addressed categorically to CAD. For 
CAD is not speech. CAD is not not speech. CAD is not the ques-
tion. 
                                                                                                                            
252  GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 43 
(Jonathan Bennett ed., Early Modern Texts 2007) (1713), available at http://www.
earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/berkeley1713.pdf. 
253  The “Red Queen” is a character of Lewis Carroll’s. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH 
THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (Univ. Cal. Press 1983) (1871). 
254  THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999). 
